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Abstract 
Whereas the traditional view in cognitive science has been to view mind and cognition as something 
that is the result of essentially inner, neural processes, the extended cognition perspective claims 
that at least some human mental states and processes stem from complex webs of causal influence 
involving  extra-neural  resources,  most  notably  the  resources  of  our  social  and  technological 
environments.  In  this  chapter,  we  explore  the  possibility  that  contemporary  and  near-future 
network systems are poised to extend and perhaps transform our human cognitive potential. We 
also  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  information  and  network  sciences  are  relevant  to  our 
understanding of various forms of cognitive extension, particularly with respect to the formation, 
maintenance and functioning of extended cognitive systems in network-enabled environments. Our 
claim is that the information and network sciences are relevant on two counts: firstly, they support 
an understanding of the mechanisms underpinning socially- and technologically-mediated forms of 
cognitive extension; secondly, they serve to guide  and inform engineering efforts that strive to 
enhance and expand our cognitive capabilities. We discuss the relevance and applicability of these 
conclusions to current and future research exploring the contribution of network technologies to 
military coalition operations. 
Introduction 
The traditional view in the sciences of the mind sees the human brain as occupying a rather special 
place in the material fabric associated with the realization of human mental states and processes. 
One only has to flick through the pages of any contemporary text on cognitive neuroscience to 
appreciate the considerable dominance of what one might call the ‘neurocentric view’. And it is a 
view that is reinforced by (and reflected in) a steady stream of brain imaging studies, many of which 
claim to have isolated the neuroanatomical basis of some aspect of our everyday psycho-cognitive 
functioning. The traditional view thus sees human mental states and processes as the direct product The Network-Extended Mind 
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of what the brain does. It claims that the machinery of the mind is housed largely within the head, 
and that to understand more about our cognitive profile we need to understand more about how 
the brain works. Eventually, it is claimed, we will have a complete theory of human cognition, and 
within this theory the human brain will occupy centre-stage. 
The validity of this neurocentric, or intra-cranial, perspective has recently been challenged by those 
who embrace situated, embodied or distributed approaches to cognition (Clark, 1999; Haugeland, 
1998;  Hutchins,  1995a;  Pfeifer  &  Bongard,  2007;  Robbins  &  Ayded,  2009).  Such  approaches 
challenge the notion that mind and cognition are solely internal (neural) phenomena by emphasizing 
the role played by extra-neural and extra-bodily factors in shaping the profile of much real-world 
cognitive processing. One view that is perhaps maximally opposed to the internalist or individualistic 
conception of the human mind (the notion that the mind is the result of purely internal processes) is 
the thesis of the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). This view explicitly endorses the idea that 
the human mind is not solely the product of what the brain does, and that the boundaries of the 
human mind are not necessarily co-extensive with the biological boundaries of the brain. Instead, 
the claim is that much of the machinery of the human mind extends beyond the brain to encompass 
a much larger nexus of extra-neural (and sometimes extra-organismic) resources. According to the 
extended mind perspective, human mental states and processes are not always in the head; they 
can sometimes extend beyond the brain to encompass aspects of the external technological and 
social environment. 
Claims  about  the  distributed  or  extended  nature  of  human  cognition  are  commonplace  in  the 
scientific and philosophical literature (Clark, 1997, 2003, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Dennett, 
1996; Haugeland, 1998; Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000; Hurley, 1998; Hutchins, 1995a; Kirsh, 1996, 
2006; Norman, 1993; Wilson, 1994; Wilson & Clark, 2009). But what do such claims really amount to 
when  we  consider  the  potential  impact  of  network  systems  and  technologies  on  our  current 
cognitive profiles? And what role do the information and network sciences play when it comes to 
understanding  socially-  and  technologically-mediated  forms of cognitive  extension? One thing  is 
relatively clear: it is that as we move into an era of pervasive computing and ubiquitous network 
access, much of our material world is becoming infused with greater computational potential, both 
for  ourselves  and  the  social  collectives  of  which  we  are  a  part.  If  we  want  to  understand  the 
opportunities (as well as the hazards
1) for cognitive transformation in this new era, we need to have 
theories and approaches that are capable of operating at the interfaces of the engineering, cognitive 
and social sciences. It is our claim, in this chapter, that the  information and network sciences are a 
vital source of such theories and approaches; they are suitably poised to advance our understanding 
of  the  mechanisms  underpinning  socially -  and  technologically-mediated  forms  of  cognitive 
extension. 
Recognizing  the  contribution  of  the  wider  social  and  technological  environment  to  cognitive 
processing (at both the individual and collective level) is of particular relevance in military coalition 
environments. Such environments are often conceptualized in terms of multi ple interconnected 
networks (i.e. networks of networks) that subtend the human, technological and informational 
domains. Such networks interact in complex, non -linear ways throughout the course of coalition 
                                                           
1 Not all forms of cognitive extension are necessarily guaranteed to impact cognition in positive ways; some 
forms of cognitive extension may prove deleterious to the cognitive capabilities of the larger system. This issue 
is taken up in the ‘Human-Centered Cognitive Extension’ section. The Network-Extended Mind 
 
3 
 
operations, and the challenge for military coalitions is often to coordinate the structure and activity 
of these networks in ways that meliorate cognitive performance. The ability of a specific coalition 
element  to  respond  in  an  adaptive  and  intelligent manner  is,  for  example, often  based on  the 
broader ability of the coalition formation to properly create, encode, select, retrieve, transform and 
communicate information-bearing structures (representations), and such information manipulation 
processes often need to be sensitive to the structure of existing communication and social networks. 
Notions of distributed and extended cognition have a special relevance here because they focus 
attention on the fundamental interdependencies between specific cognitive performances and the 
wider webs of social and technological scaffolding in which such performances take place. In this 
chapter, we aim to show why distributed and extended approaches to human cognition are relevant 
to our understanding of the inter-relationships between coalition networks and cognitive processing 
at both the individual and collective levels.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The section entitled ‘Externalism and Extension: A Brief 
History’ provides an introduction to externalist approaches to the human mind. It reviews the key 
arguments  associated  with  two  forms  of  externalism,  namely  content  externalism  and  vehicle 
externalism. Both of these forms of externalism raise doubts about the philosophical and scientific 
integrity of, what might be called, internalism (the idea that mind and cognition can be understood 
solely by focusing on internal, intra-cranial states-of-affairs). This leads on to a discussion about 
notions of cognitive extension in the section entitled ‘Cognitive Extension’. Cognitive extension has 
been  introduced  using  a  number  of  real-world  examples  in  the  literature.  These  include  long 
multiplication (see Wilson & Clark, 2009), ship navigation (Hutchins, 1995a), academic paper writing 
(Clark,  1997),  puzzle  solving  (Kirsh,  2009;  Kirsh  &  Maglio,  1994;  Maglio,  Matlock,  Raphaely, 
Chernicky, & Kirsh, 1999), and the process of artistic creation (see Clark, 2001). In this chapter we 
introduce the notion of cognitive extension using a ‘simple’ non-cognitive example, namely the 
process of spider web building behaviour. This example is intended to show how a collection of 
capabilities that is ostensibly the product of a centralized neurological resource (the spider’s nervous 
system), actually turns out, on closer inspection, to involve a variety of more far-flung forces and 
factors. Spider web weaving thus emerges as an example of what has, in the literature, been dubbed 
‘non-trivial causal spread’ (Wheeler, 2005; Wheeler & Clark, 1999), a feature that characterizes 
many cases of environmentally-extended cognition. After presenting the case for network scientific 
approaches to extended cognitive systems in the section on ‘Extended Cognitive Systems’, we then 
present the extended mind thesis in the section entitled ‘The Extended Mind’. An extended mind 
can be thought of as a particular kind of extended cognitive system, namely one that relies on the 
more or less permanent coupling of a human agent with cognitively-potent technological add-ons. 
The  section  entitled  ‘The  Web-Extended  Mind:  A  Thought  (Provoking)  Experiment’  extends  the 
discussion about the extended mind thesis and applies it to putative cases of cognitive extension 
involving the World Wide Web. In this case, we engage in a thought experiment regarding the close 
coupling of a human agent with near-future Web-based technologies. The thought experiment gives 
rise to a number of issues regarding potential shifts in our conception of ourselves as cognitively- 
and  epistemically-bounded  agents.  Issues  relating  to  socially-extended  cognition  (i.e.  cases  of 
cognitive extension involving other human agents) are reviewed in the section entitled ‘Socially-
Extended Cognition’, and this is followed by a discussion of the kinds of cognitive extension that are 
likely to be encountered in military coalition contexts in the section entitled ‘Extended Cognitive 
Systems and Military Coalitions’. A number of defence-related research programs, including the new The Network-Extended Mind 
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Network Science Collaborative Technology Alliance (CTA), feature research that is highly relevant to 
some of the issues raised in this chapter, and an overview of such programs is provided in the 
section  on  ‘Relevant  Defence-Related  Research  Programs’.  Within  the  same  section  we  briefly 
present work within the joint U.S./U.K. International Technology Alliance (ITA) research program, 
which specifically seeks to explore a number of issues related to cognitive extension in network 
environments. Such work, we suggest, can be seen as the intellectual lynchpin that connects work in 
many other research programs, such as the Network Science and Cognitive Neuroergonomics CTAs 
and the Tactical Human Integration with Networked Knowledge Army Technology Objective (THINK 
ATO). In the ‘Conclusion’ section we summarize the main arguments motivating a consideration of 
the information and network sciences to our understanding of network-mediated forms of cognitive 
extension. The section also reiterates the main points of relevance regarding cognitive extension 
research and military coalition operations.  
Externalism and Extension: A Brief History 
Historically, cognitive science has embraced a particular view of the mind, one which sees human 
mental states and processes as largely the product of inner, neural mechanisms. Human mental 
states and processes, the view maintains, are essentially realized by physical mechanisms inside the 
head of human subjects, and thus the mechanistic boundaries of the human mind are roughly co-
extensive with those of the biological brain. This particular view of the mind (which, following Wilson 
and Clark (2009), we will refer to as individualism) maintains that the human mind can be studied 
and  understood  independently  of  any  reference  to  the  external  environment.  It  essentially 
advocates what Jerry Fodor (1980) once referred to as ‘methodological solipsism’, the idea that the 
cognitive sciences can limit their study to the individual, effectively bracketing off the world in which 
the  individual  is  embedded.  On  the  individualist  view,  cognition  is  something  that  is  wedged 
between perception (on the input side) and action (on the output side), constituting the filling of 
what Susan Hurley (1998) refers to as a ‘cognitive sandwich’. The individualist conception recognizes 
the role of the wider environment as an input/output space for cognitive processes, but it does not 
afford  any  constitutive  role  for  extra-organismic  elements  in  those  processes.  Despite  a  recent 
emphasis on situated (Robbins & Ayded, 2009), distributed (Hutchins, 1995a) and embodied (Clark, 
1999; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007) approaches to cognition, internalism is still very much apparent in 
the sciences of the mind
2. In addition, it is likely that some form of neurocentric individualism best 
captures our contemporary ‘common-sense’ notions about the material origins of the human mind. 
As Noë (2009) points out: 
“We live in a time of growing excitement about the brain…Perception, memory, our likes 
and dislikes, intelligence, morality, whatever – the brain is supposed to be the organ 
responsible for all of it.” (Noë, 2009; pg xi) 
Doubts about the integrity of individualism first arose during the 1970s in the work of Hilary Putnam 
(Putnam, 1975) and Tyler Burge (Burge, 1979). The predominant concern was that individualism 
failed to adequately account for the content or meaning of mental representations. Putnam (1975) 
thus  argued  that  mental  states  could  not  be  individuated  in  accord  with  the  constraint  of 
                                                           
2 Harnad and Dror (2006) thus state “…cognition takes place entirely within the brains of cognizers…The causes 
and effects stretch more distally, but not the cognition; cognition begins and ends at the cognizer’s sensor and 
effector surfaces.” The Network-Extended Mind 
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individualism because the content of a mental representation might be determined by facts external 
to the individual, specifically the environmental or historical location of an individual. It is only by 
referencing  these  external  facts  that  the  meaning  of  an  inner  representational  item  can  be 
discerned. This form of externalism, which has been referred to as taxonomic externalism (Wilson, 
2000, 2004) or content externalism (Rowlands, 2006), is clearly contrary to the main thrust of the 
individualist thesis. It asserts that although intentional mental states exist as internal (e.g. neural) 
states of an individual, they are not (in virtue of their content) supervenient
3 on purely internal 
(intra-individual) factors.  
Despite its appeal to physical, social and historical factors, the form of externalism just described 
(content externalism) is still largely committed to an internalist perspective about the location of the 
physical structures associated with mental states and processes. Even though the content of mental 
representations  is  deemed  to  depend  on  the external  environment,  the  physical  vehicles  of 
cognition
4, it is claimed, are still likely to be situated within the head of the individual. An alternative, 
and more radical, claim is that even the physical vehicles of cognition need not be restricted to the 
internal realm. Instead, so the claim goes, the vehicles of both mental states and mental processes 
are perfectly able to  extend beyond the head into the external world. Mind, and the cognitive 
processes  that  constitute it,  sometimes extend  into  the  physical  and  social  environment of the 
individual human agent.  
This second form of externalism (which we will refer to as vehicle externalism) goes by a variety of 
names, including locational externalism (Wilson, 2000, 2004), active externalism (Clark & Chalmers, 
1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley, 1998; Rowlands, 2006), environmentalism (Rowlands, 1999), and 
the  extended  mind  (Clark  &  Chalmers,  1998).  What  unites  all  these  terms  is  a  theoretical 
commitment to the idea that the physical boundaries of a cognitive system should not be assumed 
to coincide with the traditional biological boundaries of skin and skull. Instead, cognition is seen as 
something that is often an environmentally-extended process. To fully understand human cognition, 
it is not enough to focus solely on the inner states of the individual; for such a focus reveals only a 
partial  picture  of  cognitive  processing.  Instead,  we  need  to  look  beyond  the  individual,  to 
understand the way in which cognition is fundamentally situated and embedded within a larger 
nexus of physical and social influences.  
The  notion  of  vehicle  externalism,  as  just  described,  is  something  that  will  occupy  us  for  the 
remainder of this chapter. However, before we embark on that discussion, it is important to point 
out that claims about vehicle externalism are largely orthogonal to those of content externalism. 
Content externalism is a theory about how the content of (inner) mental representations supervene 
                                                           
3 The notion of supervenience represents a kind of dependency relationship between sets of properties. A set 
of properties (X) is said to supervene on another set of properties (Y) if objects that are indistinguishable from 
the perspective of Y properties are also indistinguishable from the perspective of X properties (see Braddon-
Mitchell  &  Jackson,  2007).  Thus  mental  states  (x)  supervene  on  brain  states  (y)  if  brain  states  that  are 
physically indistinguishable are associated with mental states that are also indistinguishable. The claim of 
content externalism is that this is not the case: the content of mental states supervenes on facts that are 
external to the neurophysiological details. 
4 The vehicles of cognition are the physical states and processes associated with mental states and processes. 
The distinction between contents (as in content externalism) and the vehicles of contents (vehicle externalism) 
is a distinction between the content (or meaning) and the thing that has the content (or meaning). For 
example, the content of a written sentence is the  meaning of the sentence, while the thing that has the 
content (or is the bearer of the content) is the sequence of written words. The Network-Extended Mind 
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on facts about the historical and environmental location of an individual. Vehicle externalism, in 
contrast, does not concern itself with how representational vehicles acquire the meaning or content 
they do; it is primarily a theory about the nature and interaction of the vehicles themselves. In 
advocating vehicle externalism, we are essentially committing ourselves to an understanding about 
how the physical, social and technological environment contributes to the material realization of 
specific states and cognitive performances; we are relatively less concerned with how those states 
and performances acquire their specific contents. 
Cognitive Extension 
The claims of vehicle externalism have a somewhat radical sounding flavour to them
5, but the notion 
that the physical vehicles of cognition are not restricted to the inner, neural realm is a notion that is 
perfectly compatible with the claims of both physicalism and functionalism (see Braddon-Mitchell & 
Jackson, 2007). And although the dominant view in artificial intelligence research (at least in the last 
century) was guided by predominantly individualistic and internalist conceptions of the mind, there 
is nothing in the bedrock claims of classical cognitivist theory (Newell, 1980; Newell & Simon, 1976; 
Pylyshyn, 1984) that necessarily binds intelligence to internally -situated mechanisms
6. In spite of 
this, the claims of vehicle externalism are largely counter to our common-sense intuitions about the 
human mind, and this often results in a deep sc epticism about the tenability of the core claims. To 
make both the claims of the vehicle externalist thesis clearer, and to invite a principled consideration 
of the relevant ideas, it helps to start with the simple (and in our case non -cognitive
7). Therefore, 
this section begins with a simple, but powerful, demonstration of how intelligent behaviour can 
emerge from the delicate interplay of forces and factors that extend beyond the neural realm. In 
                                                           
5 Indeed, the notion of cognitive extension has been the subject of a lively debate in the philosophical and 
cognitive  scientific  literature.  Criticisms  of  the  extended  mind  thesis  centre  on  issues  of  cognitive  and 
computational control (Butler, 1998), the distinction between intrinsic and derived contents (Adams & Aizawa, 
2001, 2008, 2009, in press), and worries about the vulnerability of external resources to damage and social 
manipulation (Sterelny, 2004). All of these concerns have been addressed by Andy Clark in a series of recent 
publications (Clark, 2005, 2007a; Clark, in press-a, in press-b; Wilson & Clark, 2009). Clark (2008) provides a 
good summary of the criticisms and associated responses.  
6 Indeed, Edwin Hutchins  (1995a) depicts the symbol-manipulating vision of classical cognitive science a s, in 
fact,  a  vision  of  environmentally -situated  problem-solving.  According  to  this  vision,  the  human  agent 
implements a serial, symbol manipulating processing economy by virtue of his or her interaction with a variety 
of external props, aids and artefacts.  
7 The extent to which this behaviour is, in fact, non -cognitive depends very much on one’s view of what 
constitutes cognition. The problem is that what is and what is not a cognitive process is often determined by 
ostensive definition. We can therefore point to examples of cognitive processing (e.g. perceiving, reasoning, 
thinking and so on), but establishing precisely what it is that makes something a cognitive process is much 
harder. Adams and Aizawa (2001) favour a view of cognition that highlights the role of representations with 
‘intrinsic’ as opposed to ‘derived’ intentionality. Unfortunately, however, it is not entirely clear what is meant 
by the notion of intrinsic intentionality, or when we confront representations whose content is intrinsically 
given. Rowlands (2006) defines a cognitive process as “one that: (i) is required for the accomplishing of a 
cognitive task, (ii) involves information processing, and (iii) is of the sort that is capable a yielding a cognitive 
state” (pg. 32). In this definition, the notion of a ‘cognitive task’ is defined by ostension, and the notion of a 
cognitive  state  is  construed  as  a  genuinely  representational  state;  i.e.  a  state  that  can  be  seen  as 
representational in virtue of its satisfaction of a host of additional criteria. The main problem here, of course, 
concerns the fact that we are still relying on ostensive definitions for the notion of a cognitive task. We also 
encounter problems regarding the precise conditions under which a physical state should count as one that is 
genuinely representational.  The Network-Extended Mind 
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subsequent sections, we expand on this initial case study and show how vehicle externalist views 
can be applied to more complex forms of ‘human-level’ problem-solving. 
Web Construction 
The web of the garden cross spider (Araneus diadematus), like that of most orb web spiders, is a 
compelling example of how our initial intuitions about the problem-solving potential of a seemingly 
simple bio-computational system (in this case an insect nervous system) can founder in the face of 
real-world performance. The spider’s central nervous system is composed of a number of ganglia 
(collections  of  neural  tissue),  of  which  the  most  prominent  are  the  supraesophagal  and 
subesophagal ganglia. These ganglia serve to implement and coordinate the majority of the spider’s 
sensorimotor functions. The total number of neurons in the central nervous system is small, about 
30,000 neurons in the case of the orb-web spider Argiope and 100,000 neurons in the case of the 
larger wandering spider Cupiennius (Foelix, 1996). This compares with somewhere in the region of 
100 billion neurons for the average human brain. Given the scale of the spider’s nervous system, we 
might expect its behavioural capacities to be somewhat limited. And yet spiders are capable of 
surprisingly complex behaviours
8, of which the most well known is probably web construction. The 
spider’s web is architecturally complex, composed as it is of multiple types of silk thread, each laid 
down in a specific sequence and geometric pattern. Specific types of thread need to be produced at 
just the right time, and the overall design of the web has to be sensitive to a number of factors 
including the size of the prey to be caught and the shape of the local environment (the shape made 
available by local branches or other supporting structures). The problem might be easier if it was 
possible  to  use  visual  information  to  guide  action  selection  processes;  however,  Araneus  is 
practically blind and does not rely on visual information to complete the web construction process 
(Witt, Reed, & Peakall, 1968). The average human being, blindfolded and presented with the task of 
creating a complex geometric structure from multiple types of building material, might be hard 
pressed to match the spider’s feat of engineering, and this is despite the fact that our own neural 
systems far outstrip the size and complexity of those possessed by the average orb web spider. The 
feat of web construction seems to require a capacity for judgement, decision-making and planning 
that is profoundly out of kilter with our expectations and intuitions about what the spider should be 
capable of. So just how does the spider do it? 
The answer seems to lie in the spider’s exploitation of bodily contingencies and the power of the 
local environment to structure and guide action choice. A detailed ethological examination of web 
spinning behaviour suggests that spiders are sensitive to certain bodily contingencies involving the 
relative positioning of their legs on certain types of silk thread (Krink & Vollrath, 1997, 1998, 1999). 
As the web develops, the positioning of the legs becomes a reliable cue as to what type of action 
needs to be executed next, as well as what type of silk needs to be produced. In essence, the web 
serves as “its own best model” (Brooks, 1991) of what needs to be accomplished, and the spider 
need only be responsive to local information concerning the structural organization of threads in the 
immediate vicinity of its body. At each stage of the web construction process, each of the spider’s 
legs need only perform a local (spatial) search for the nearest thread, and, once located, the relative 
positioning of the legs (as well as the type of thread they are in contact with) ‘represents’ the web’s 
                                                           
8 The araneophagic spiders, in particular, have been shown to engage in a variety of complex behaviours, 
ranging from optimal route selection (Tarsitano & Jackson, 1997) to deceptive signalling (Wilcox & Jackson, 
2002). The Network-Extended Mind 
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structural status. In response to this rich body of local information, the spider need only implement 
locally-effective rules concerning which action to perform. And it turns out that aspects of spider 
web weaving behaviour can be modelled using a relatively simple (and minimal) set of rules (Krink & 
Vollrath, 1997, 1999). Importantly, each rule exploits facts about the spider’s bodily design, and its 
outputs  specify  actions  that  are  geared  to  structuring  the  problem  space  in  ways  that  guide, 
constrain and simplify subsequent behaviour. The spider, it seems, distributes the computational 
burden associated with web spinning behaviour across a complex system that comprises its brain, 
body and aspects of the (self-structured) external environment
9.  
So perhaps the reason we find the spider’s web spinning behaviour both remarkable and mysterious 
(relative to its rather meagre neuro-computational resources) is because we fail to appreciate the 
behaviour for what it really is: a compelling example of environmentally-extended bio-morphological 
computation
10, one in which neural, bodily and environmental factors play representationally and 
computationally-significant roles. The central nervous system of the spider  no doubt plays a very 
important coordinative role in the process of web construction, but it is only one element of a 
complex, environmentally extended system, and its representational resources and computational 
capabilities are geared not towards to the manipulation and transformation of abstract disembodied 
symbolic representations that occupy some inner, neural realm, but rather to the generation of 
temporally extended action sequences, actions that themselves serve to progressively structure and 
restructure the target problem-space in computationally- and representationally-potent ways. 
The moral of this story, then, is that it is easy to be misled into thinking that intelligent action is 
always the sole product of neural mechanisms  – that the point source of intelligent behaviour is 
always something that must reside in the ‘head’ of an agent. For what the case of web construction 
teaches us is that agents may often co-opt a variety of far flung forces and factors into a problem-
solving routine, and not all of these forces and factors need to be biological in nature. We should not 
necessarily be surprised by this outcome. Evolution does not care about the material nature of 
problem-solving  resources;  it  only  cares  about  how  those  resources  can  be  exploited  to  meet 
adaptive behavioural ends. Artificial evolutionary processes attest to the variety of ways in which 
seemingly irrelevant forces and factors may be co-opted into a design solution. Thus, in using genetic 
algorithms to evolve real electronic circuits, Bird and Layzell (2002) managed to create an ‘oscillator 
circuit’ whose systemic oscillatory behaviour was parasitic on the radio signals being generated from 
a nearby computer. In essence, the evolving circuit had generated the correct oscillatory behaviour, 
but had done so not by creating a genuine oscillator circuit; it had solved the problem by evolving 
radio reception capabilities and relaying the oscillations created by nearby circuits. Such phenomena 
are a common feature of many evolutionary processes. Thompson, Harvey and Husbands (1996) 
thus argue that during the evolution of electronic circuitry: 
“…it can be expected that all the detailed physics of the hardware will be brought to 
bear  on  the  problem  at  hand:  time  delays,  parasitic  capacitances  cross-talk,  meta-
                                                           
9 Its body is (perhaps non-accidentally) designed so as to best exploit this state of affairs – you can represent 
quite a lot of information when your representational repertoire is sensitive to the spatial dynamics of a 
system comprising eight articulated appendages! 
10 Morphological computation concerns the way in which the physical body of a robot or organism can be used 
to perform computationally-significant functions (Paul, 2004, 2006). The Network-Extended Mind 
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stability constraints and other low-level characteristics might all be used in generating 
the evolved behaviour.” (pg. 21) 
What we begin to see, therefore, is that for any given problem-solving process, evolution may often 
assemble solutions that pay scant regard to the manner in which the problem is solved. In many 
cases, the nature of the solution yielded by an evolutionary process will draw on whatever resources 
are available to meet the representational and computational demands of the problem at hand. And 
the responsibility for yielding adaptive behavioural success will, in many cases, be distributed across 
a broad coalition of neural, bodily and environmental resources. 
We thus approach the main take home message of this section. It is that when seen in a certain light, 
the external environment emerges as more than just a space for sensory inputs and motor outputs; 
it is also poised to play an important (explanatorily-potent) role in the mechanisms by which that 
behaviour  is  realized.  Intelligent  behaviour,  we  might  say,  is  at  least  sometimes  realized  by 
processing loops that extend beyond the neural realm and productively incorporate a variety of 
extra-neural resources. Some forms of behavioural intelligence are, we might say, environmentally-
extended with regard to their mechanistic realization. 
There is a parallel here – one that follows on nicely from the account of spiders and evolutionary 
processes  –  with  Richard  Dawkins’  (1982)  account  of  the  extended  phenotype.  As  part  of  his 
introduction to The Extended Phenotype, Dawkins (1982) encourages us to ignore the traditional 
biological boundary of the body and instead focus on the way in which external structures can form 
part of an extended system, one that is both created and maintained by specific genetic influences. 
From this ‘extended’ viewpoint, we can, he suggests, regard the spider’s web as part of the spider’s 
phenotype;  it  is  a  system  that,  just  like  the  spider’s  body,  determines  the  extent to  which the 
spider’s genes will be transmitted to future generations. The spider’s web, when viewed through the 
special lens of the extended phenotype, thus emerges as a more-or-less equal partner in a complex 
matrix  of  phenotypic  structures  (some  biological  and  others  not)  all  of  which  are  subject  to 
evolutionary selection pressures.  
But there is a deeper analogy here, one that goes beyond the level of extended phenotypes and 
extended behavioural mechanisms. It is the role that genes themselves play with regard to the 
generation of phenotypic structures. For in many ways, we suggest, the mechanisms by which genes 
control, regulate and contribute to the emergence of ontogenetic and cellular processes via their 
participation in genetic regulatory networks is directly analogous to the role played by the spider’s 
nervous system in architecting its web. Just as the spider’s web-spinning performances can seem 
remarkable  relative  to  its  available  neuro-computational  resources,  so  the  morphological  and 
physiological complexity of organisms can often seem surprising relative to the number of genes 
encoding their development (Claverie, 2001). Studies in functional genomics, for example, reveal 
that the number of protein-coding genes in the case of the human genome is about 20000-25000 
genes  (International  Human  Genome  Sequencing  Consortium,  2004),  while  that  for  the  rather 
unsophisticated  nematode  worm,  Caenorhabditis  elegans,  is  a  surprising  20,000  (C.  elegans 
Sequencing Consortium, 1998). These results are surprising because, inasmuch as one sees genes as 
coding directly for specific aspects of physical form and function, one would have expected relative 
differences in large-scale phenotypic complexity to be reflected in large-scale differences in gene 
number. So how do we reconcile the apparent similarity of gene numbers in the case of C. elegans The Network-Extended Mind 
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and H. sapiens with the apparent differences in physiological and structural complexity manifested 
by the two species? 
One  approach  to  answering  this  question  is  to  emphasize  the  complex  relationships  that  exist 
between  an  organism’s  physical  structure  and  the  genetic  substrates  that  supposedly  encode 
aspects of that structure. Thus, we now  recognize that genes participate in complex regulatory 
networks that, in addition to producing structural proteins, also serve to constrain and control the 
expression of specific genes via protein-based feedback mechanisms (see Kauffman, 1995). Genes do 
not,  therefore,  seem  to  encode  directly  for  specific  aspects  of  physical  structure;  instead,  they 
participate in the creation of complex networks of feedback and feedforward influence that, in 
conjunction with other factors, contribute to much of the biological complexity that we ultimately 
observe.  Commenting  on  the  surprising  similarity  of  gene  numbers  between  species,  Buchanan 
(2002) points out that genes encode for proteins, and it is these proteins, interacting in complex 
webs of causal influence, that determines the differences between species. In order to understand 
the real role and function of genes, therefore, one needs to adopt a perspective that is specifically 
geared to understanding the complexity of network systems: 
“To comprehend what makes us alive, and especially what distinguishes us from plants, 
will require insight into the architecture of this vast network; our sophistication is not 
due  to  one  or  another  protein,  but  to  the  delicate  design  of  the  entire  network.” 
(Buchanan, 2002; pg. 16) 
The analogy with the spider’s web building behaviour is thus revealed. In both cases what we seem 
to confront is the presence of a core biological resource (neuronal or genetic) whose function it is to 
create networks of causal influence (some of which operate in the manner of a closed-loop feedback 
control system). Such networks, in conjunction with the core biological resource, realize functions 
whose complexity far outstrips that made possible by the initial encodings or (in the case of the 
brain) computational processes. To see the core biological resource as causally-relevant to the final 
outcome (i.e. behaviour or phenotype) of the network in question is not, of course, incorrect, but it 
is important to give proper explanatory weight to the role played by the networks that extend 
beyond the boundaries of the core resource. And it is important, in both cases, to recognize the 
functional contributions of the neural and genetic resources for what they really are: mechanisms to 
create, maintain and exploit networks of causal influence that subtend a variety of organismic and 
extra-organismic resources. It is not possible, we suggest, to understand the proper function and 
significance  of  the  core  resource  (genome  and  brain)  in  the  absence  of  this  network-oriented 
perspective, and we certainly cannot afford to restrict our scientific attention to these resources if 
we  ever  hope  to  understand  how  higher-level  phenomena  (such  as  biological  structure  and 
intelligent behaviour) are produced. For to divest these resources of their inter-relationships with 
the complex networks in which they participate (and often create) is to lose sight of something 
explanatorily vital in our quest to  understand the contribution of those resources to the target 
phenomena of interest. It is lose sight of the fact that the functional significance of neural and 
genetic resources is often determined by networks that extend far beyond the neural and genetic 
realms. The Network-Extended Mind 
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Puzzles, Papers and Human-Level Problems 
The  critic  will,  of  course,  have  identified  a  particular  problem  associated  with  the  foregoing 
discussion, namely that, at least in the case of arachnid behaviour, we have focused on a form of 
intelligent behaviour that is far removed from the traditional targets of cognitive scientific enquiry 
(e.g.  the  realm  of  deliberative thought,  planning,  complex  problem-solving  and  so  on).  This  we 
accept, although it is not always clear to what extent ostensibly simple forms of adaptive behaviour 
should always be regarded as essentially non-cognitive in nature (see note 7). In spite of this, it is 
important to show how the notion of vehicle externalism can be applied to behaviours that are less 
controversially construed as cognitive. In the current section, therefore, we introduce a few more 
examples of intelligent behaviour in which human-level cognitive capabilities seem to draw on a 
variety of causal influences distributed across brain, body and world.    
Consider first the case of multiplying two three digit numbers. A purely internalist account of how 
we are able to multiply the two numbers might emphasize how we first derive some symbolic 
encoding of the visual (or auditory) input corresponding to the two numbers. It would then invoke a 
computational account according to which the inner symbols are manipulated in some way so as to 
achieve the correct mathematical outcome. Now contrast this with what is surely a more accurate 
(ecologically-realistic)  picture  of  how  we  implement  long  multiplication  in  the  real-world.  This 
alternative picture involves the active manipulation of external symbols in such a way that the kind 
of  problem  confronting  the  biological  brain  is  profoundly  simplified.  In  place  of  purely  inner 
computational operations we see a pattern of perception-action cycles in which single digit numbers 
are compared and intermediate computational results are stored in an external medium using (e.g.) 
pen and paper. This example, described in Wilson and Clark (2009), is a case of what we might call 
environmentally-extended computation or ‘wide computationalism’ (Wilson, 1994). It takes what is, 
ostensibly, an inner cognitive capability (an ability to do long multiplication) and shows how crucial 
aspects of the problem-solving process can be (and usually are) delegated to aspects of the external 
environment. Importantly, the human agent in this situation emerges as a cognitive agent that (by 
virtue of culturally-scaffolded educational regimes) is able to make best use of a number of external 
props, aids and artefacts in order to meliorate problem-solving. Such melioration often occurs as a 
result of the way in which physical actions are used to structure and restructure aspects of the local 
external environment. In most cases, the result of the environmental restructuring is to radically 
simplify or transform the kind of problem-solving process in which the biological brain must engage. 
Moving beyond the case of long multiplication, we encounter a number of cases where real-world 
action has been accorded an important role in enabling human subjects to navigate complex (and 
perhaps otherwise intractable) problem domains (Kirsh, 2009; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; Maglio et al., 
1999). David Kirsh (1995), for example, suggests a mechanism by which we are able to achieve 
success  in  the  game  of  Scrabble
11. Cast as a purely internal process, the cognitive demands of 
Scrabble  seem  considerab le,  but  our  problem -solving  performances  in  the  real -world  often 
circumvent these overheads by relying on physical actions that simplify the kind of problem we are 
confronted with. Thus, in playing Scrabble, we typically engage in a process of active manipulation of 
the Scrabble tiles so as to construct spatial orderings and configurations that work in concert with 
the pattern matching and pattern completing capabilities of the human brain. Some initial (perhaps 
random) spatial orderings serve to prompt the recall of specific word candidates, and these can then 
                                                           
11 See Maglio et al (1999) for some empirical research on this issue. The Network-Extended Mind 
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be  evaluated  and  extended  by  further  letter  juxtapositions  and  spatial  configurations.  What  is 
important here, as elsewhere, is to recognize the important and powerful role that physical action 
and environmental structure plays with regard to the larger problem-solving process. In the case of 
Scrabble and other problem domains (see Kirsh, 2009), Kirsh and Maglio (1994) suggest that certain 
types of action play key roles in enabling us to solve the problem in question. They refer to such 
actions as epistemic actions. These are actions that enable us to make information available
12 in 
ways that meliorate some aspect of our problem-solving performances. And it is epistemic actions, 
Clark (2008) suggests, that occupy centre-stage in discussions about how extended cognitive systems 
are brought into existence on the back of our active physical engagement with the external world: 
“…epistemic actions, I want to suggest, are paramount among the ways in which bodily 
activity  yields  transient  but  cognitively  crucial  extended  functional  organizations.” 
(Clark, 2008; pg. 70) 
As a final example of extended cognition in action (!), consider the process of writing an academic 
paper or report, such as the one that confronts you now. One view as to how we generate such 
artefacts  might  emphasize  the  role  of  purely  inner  resources  in  contributing  to  fully-formed 
thoughts, which are then serialized as words on paper. But this, of course, is seldom, if ever, how 
real academic texts get written. For better or worse, what generally tends to happen is that we start 
by writing down a few fragmentary thoughts and ideas, and these then prompt further thoughts and 
ideas.  As  the  paper  emerges,  a  variety  of  external  resources,  such  as  text  and  papers,  often 
themselves heavily annotated with notes and marginalia, are continually consulted. As Clark (1997) 
argues: 
“[the text] does not spring fully formed from inner cogitations. Instead, it is the product 
of a sustained and iterated sequence of interactions between my brain and a variety of 
external props. In these cases, I am willing to say, a good deal of actual thinking involves 
loops and circuits that run outside the head and through the local environment. Extended 
intellectual arguments and theses are almost always the products of brains acting in 
concert  with  multiple  external  resources.  These  resources  enable  us  to  pursue 
manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and data that would quickly baffle the un-
augmented brain.” (pg. 207) 
Note  that  what  is  important  here  is  the  way  in  which  some  of  the  environmentally-extended 
processing loops are deemed to be constitutive of the thought processes giving rise to the finished 
article.  Thinking,  on  this  view,  is  not  something  that  occurs  solely  within  the  head;  it  is  also 
something  that  can  be  spread  across  a  variety  of  extra-neural  and  extra-corporeal  resources. 
Thinking, as with other types of cognitive processing, is sometimes literally extended into the world 
outside the head. 
Extended Cognitive Systems 
Our aim in this section has been to highlight the way in which some forms of intelligent behaviour 
seem  to  depend  on  the  interaction  of  a  variety  of  resources,  including  body  morphology, 
environmental structure, and neural processing. In fact all of the examples presented in this section 
are examples of what has been called ‘non-trivial causal spread’ (Wheeler, 2005; Wheeler & Clark, 
                                                           
12 For an extended discussion of the notion of ‘making information available’, particularly with respect to 
Gibson’s (1966) theory of visual perception, see Rowlands (2006; pg. 34-40). The Network-Extended Mind 
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1999). This is something which occurs whenever we encounter a phenomenon that has the initial 
appearance of being the product of a well-demarcated system, but which, on closer inspection, turns 
out to involve the exploitation of a variety of more far-flung forces and factors. Whenever we have a 
case of non-trivial causal spread, we also have a case of explanatory spread; i.e. a relative expansion 
of our explanatory frameworks to account for the phenomenon in question. Such spread seeks to 
give explanatory weight to factors that we initially supposed were causally-irrelevant with respect to 
some target phenomenon. In cases where the target phenomenon is a cognitive process, then it 
makes sense to see the causally-active physical vehicles of the process as extending beyond the 
inner, neural realm. And, inasmuch as we equate the boundaries of a cognitive system with the 
physical limits of the mechanisms that comprise that system’s cognitive processing routines, then 
cognition is, at least sometimes, not bounded by the traditional borders of skin and skull; it emerges 
as something that is perfectly able to extend beyond the head and seep into the world. 
Of course, in order to make this radical-sounding claim stick, we need to do adequate justice to the 
notion that patterns of causal influence and dependence are sufficient to warrant a readjustment of 
cognitive system boundaries. It is not enough to claim that an external resource becomes part of the 
system simply because it exerts a causal influence on some aspect of system processing. What is 
needed is a clear understanding of  when environmentally-situated cognition becomes a case of 
genuine cognitive extension. When, in other words, does some external tool or resource become 
incorporated into an agent’s cognitive processing routines? 
There are a number of ways to approach this problem (see Haugeland (1998) and Clark (2007b) for 
two  related,  but  subtly  different,  accounts),  but  much  clearly  rests  on  the  extent  of  functional 
integration  between  the  candidate  component  and  the  larger  system.  We  tend  to  recognize  a 
functionally-unified system, we suggest, when the various components of that system participate in 
the  realization  of  some  goal  or  purpose  it  is  the  system’s  job  to  achieve.  What  seems  to  be 
important then in the case of cognitive extension is that we confront a set of distinct components 
(brain, body and worldly elements) that are connected together in such a way that their functional 
inter-operation makes them part of a functionally-integrated (yet internally differentiated) whole. In 
other words, what seems to be important is the specific way in which the components cooperate in 
the processing and exchange of information for the purposes of accomplishing some specific task or 
objective, a task that we typically identify as the responsibility of a specific agent (in most cases, an 
individual human agent). What makes something a part of an extended cognitive system, we claim, 
relates to the details of the functional connectivity and patterns of information flow and influence 
that characterize the inter-operation of the various system components. It is in precisely this sense 
that we conceive of an extended cognitive system as consisting of a network of heterogeneous 
elements, each of which makes a specific functional contribution to the shape and profile of the 
cognitive performances manifest by the larger system
13. 
                                                           
13 This is not to say that such contributions are always indispensable – take away the physical rotation of Tetris 
zoids (see Kirsh & Maglio, 1994) and the subject may still be able to make do with purely internal rotational 
strategies. This does not, however, detract from the fact that when external resources are available, and 
productively coupled into ongoing sequences of neural operations and world-involving actions, they can still 
become incorporated into transient systemic wholes whose purpose is the efficient realization of a cognitive 
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Given this characterization of an extended cognitive system as a coordinated pattern of information 
flow and influence between networked components, it should be obvious why we see a role for the 
network and information sciences as contributing to our understanding of extended cognition. For 
such  sciences  are  ideally  poised  to  inform  our  understanding  of  how  various  heterogeneous 
components can interact in highly complex, nested and non-linear ways in order to realize cognitive 
functions. In addition, such a role is perfectly commensurate with the role to which such sciences are 
already  being  applied  in  the  areas  of  neuroscience,  economics,  ecology,  cellular  biology, 
organizational analysis and epidemiology (Barabasi, 2002; Buchanan, 2002; Watts, 2003). Few would 
dispute the claim, we suspect, that network science is relevant to the project of understanding how 
large-scale neuronal ensembles are able to give rise to cognitively-interesting phenomena
14; our 
claim is simply that the analytic targets of network science will often have to encompass a much 
broader range of resources when it comes to understanding the profile of much (but not necessarily 
all) real-world cognition. In this respect, the application of network science to extended cognitive 
science is perfectly compatible with existing research efforts in the information and network 
sciences; it simply extends the traditional focus of analysis to a much broad er range of material 
resources.  
One might, of course, be inclined to point out that the extended networks we see in the case of 
extended cognitive systems are not like those we encounter in conventional forms of network 
scientific analyses, especially those focused on the neural domain. The networks associated with an 
extended cognitive system seem to include a broad range of disparate elements (brains, bodies, and 
external artefacts), and this makes such networks unlike those that are the typical focus of  
neuroscientific  enquiry.  Doesn’t  the  heterogeneity  of  elements  within  such  networks  mitigate 
against network-based analysis, and shouldn’t we perhaps try to understand the capabilities of the 
neural sub-systems independently of the other, bio-external, elements?  
We reject this claim for a number of reasons, not least because it is unclear whether the capabilities 
and  performance  profile  of  an  extended  cognitive  system  can  be  understood  by  a  strategy  of 
piecemeal decomposition and componential analysis (see the discussion on emergent capabilities in 
the section entitled ‘The Web-Extended Mind: A Thought (Provoking) Experiment’). Moreover, the 
heterogeneity of extended cognitive networks is, in our view, a reason why we should embrace 
network-  and  information-based  scientific  approaches.  The  components  that  may  comprise  an 
extended cognitive system are indeed wildly disparate and various. They may include simple textual 
cues and prompts, or they may involve specific cognitive artefacts, such as slide rules, compasses, 
and so on (see Hutchins, 1995a). In some cases, the external technological resource may participate 
in  computational  processes  independent  of  the  human  agent  (e.g.  mobile  devices  or  decision 
support systems), or the resource may not even be technological in nature (it may, for example, be a 
another human agent – see the section entitled ‘Socially-Extended Cognition’). Such heterogeneity 
merits  and  perhaps  even  necessitates  the  analytic  techniques  and  conceptual  theorizing  of 
disciplines whose empirical targets are those of patterns of information-based flow and influence in 
materially-abstract  functional  organizations.  The  information  and  network  sciences  are  ideally 
poised to provide this kind of abstract, functional analysis of extended cognitive systems. 
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Another reason why we suggest the information and network sciences are relevant to the study of 
extended cognitive systems relates to the fact that we are not always solely interested in analysis. 
Part of our interest in understanding extended cognitive systems is to be able to engineer new 
systems, or at least engineer environments and resources in which cognitively-relevant mergers, 
interactions and alliances can be established. What we need to understand, as engineers, are the 
kinds of technologies that are apt for integration and incorporation into existing and sometimes 
novel  cognitive  routines.  Some  of  this  is,  of  course,  the  focus  of  existing  and  well-established 
scientific disciplines, such as the disciplines of Human-Centered Technologies and Human-Centered 
Computing (Norman, 1993, 1998). But in the case of our current profile of technological innovation 
and  development,  the  sciences  that  deal  with  patterns  of  network-mediated  interaction  and 
influence have a special relevance. This is precisely because ours is an era in which information and 
communication networks, as well as a host of networked multimedia devices, are both pervasive 
and increasingly intertwined with our daily problem-solving activities and routines. If we are to 
exploit the power and potential of these new network-enabled environments, then we need tools, 
techniques and ways of thinking that are inherently sensitive to the features of network systems. It 
is precisely for this reason that the information and network sciences are relevant to our effort to 
understand and engineer network-mediated forms of bio-technological intelligence. 
The Extended Mind 
The  previous  section  highlighted  the  way  in  which  certain  types  of  intelligent  behaviour  and 
cognitive processing seem to include (as wholes do their proper parts) mechanisms that extend 
beyond the traditional biological borders of skin and skull. The specific claim was that, under at least 
some conditions, we are warranted in seeing cognition as, quite literally, extending into the extra-
organismic environment. The argument as currently presented, however, might be seen as applying 
to a narrow subset of mental states and processes, relative to those that we typically associate with 
a human mind. In accounting for much of the behaviour of both ourselves and others we typically 
make reference to a set of common-sense, mentalistic terms (such as belief, desire, hope, fear, and 
so  on),  and  these  are  seen  as  playing  a  genuine  explanatory  role  in  psychologically-interesting 
patterns of behaviour. Thus my action to retrieve a beer from the fridge is explained in terms of my 
‘desire’ to drink a beer and my ‘belief’ that a beer could be found in the fridge. It is this kind of 
intentional characterization (the ascription of intentional mental states) that helps us make sense of 
(to understand) patterns of human behaviour – it enables us to gain a predictively and explanatorily 
potent toehold on patterns of behaviour that would otherwise be psychologically unintelligible to us. 
So the question that arises in the case of cognitively-extended systems is whether the notion of 
cognitive extension gains any purchase in the more ethereal domain of folk-psychological discourse 
(the  strategy  of  explaining  human  behaviour  with  respect  to  mental  states,  such  as  belief  and 
desire). Can the notion of cognitive extension, as currently presented, be extended to account for 
the mental states that are posited as causally-relevant to the psychological understanding of our 
everyday patterns of behaviour? Can we, in other words, extend the case of an environmentally-
extended cognitive system to the more general case of an environmentally-extended mind?  
It is here (perhaps not surprisingly) that the philosophical waters begin to run deep. Perhaps the 
most lucid and influential account of why we should take notions such as extended belief states 
seriously is provided by Clark and Chalmers (1998) in their classic paper, ‘The Extended Mind’. Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) ask us to imagine two individuals: Inga and Otto, both of whom are situated in The Network-Extended Mind 
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New York City. Inga is a normal human agent with all the usual cognitive competences, but Otto 
suffers  from  a  mild  form  of  dementia  and  is  thus  impaired  when  it  comes  to  certain  acts  of 
information storage and recall. To attenuate the impact of his impairment on his daily behaviour, 
Otto relies on a conventional notebook which he uses to store important pieces of information. Otto 
is so reliant on the notebook and so accustomed to using it that he carries the notebook with him 
wherever he goes and accesses the notebook fluently and automatically whenever he needs to do 
so. Having thus set the stage, Clark and Chalmers (1998) ask us to imagine a case where both Otto 
and Inga wish to visit the Museum of Modern Art to see a particular exhibition. Inga thinks for a 
moment, recalls that the museum is on 53
rd street, and then walks to the museum. It is clear that in 
making this episode of behaviour intelligible (or psychologically transparent) to us Inga must have 
desired to enter the museum, and it is clear that she walked to 53
rd street because she believed that 
that was where the museum was located. Obviously, Inga did not believe that the museum was on 
53
rd street in an occurrent sense (i.e. she has not spent her entire life consciously thinking about the 
museum’s location); rather, she entertained the belief in a dispositional sense. Inga’s belief, like 
perhaps many of her beliefs, was sitting in memory, waiting to be accessed as and when needed. 
Now consider the case of Otto. Otto hears about the exhibition, decides to visit the museum, and 
then consults his notebook to retrieve the museum’s location. The notebook says the museum is on 
53
rd street, and so that is where Otto goes. Now, in accounting for Otto’s actions we conclude, pretty 
much as we did for Inga, that Otto desired to go to the museum and that he walked to 53
rd street 
because that is where he believed the museum was located. Obviously, Otto did not believe that the 
museum was on 53
rd street in an occurrent sense (Otto has not spent much of his life constantly 
looking  at  the  particular  page  in  his  notebook  containing  museum-related  facts);  rather,  he 
entertained the belief in a dispositional sense. Otto’s belief, like perhaps many of his beliefs, was 
sitting in the notebook, waiting to be accessed as and when needed.  
Clark and Chalmers (1998)  thus argue that the case of Otto establishes the case for a form of 
externalism about Otto’s states of dispositional believing. The notebook, they argue, plays a role 
that is functionally akin to the role played by Inga’s onboard bio-memory. If this is indeed the case, 
then it seems to make sense to see the notebook as part of the material supervenience base for 
some of Otto’s mental states, specifically his states of dispositional belief (such as those involving 
museum locations). The main point of the argument is to establish a (potential) role for external 
artefacts in constituting the physical machinery of at least some of our mental states and processes. 
If, as Clark and Chalmers (1998) argue, the functional contribution of an external device is the same 
as  that  provided  by  some  inner  resource,  then  it  seems  unreasonable  to  restrict  the  material 
mechanisms of the mind to the inner, neural realm. It seems possible, at least in principle, for the 
human mind to occasionally extend beyond the head and into the external world.  
Such claims are, understandably, disconcerting, and it is important that we understand the precise 
nature of the claim that is being made. One immediate cause for concern relates to the notion of 
functional  equivalence  between  the  inner  (e.g.  bio-memory)  and  outer  (e.g.  notebook) 
contributions.  If  we  allow  any  form  of  externally-derived  influence  to  count  as  part  of  the 
mechanistic substrate of the mind, then doesn’t this cast the mechanistic net too widely? Don’t we 
end up confronting cases that are so blatantly counter-intuitive that they undermine the very notion 
of the mind as a proper focus of scientific and philosophical enquiry? Consider, for example, the case 
where two people have a conversation on the bus. Does this mean that their respective minds have The Network-Extended Mind 
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merged into one integrated whole? And what about cases where we have some very loose coupling 
with an external information source, say the kind of access we have to information in a conventional 
textbook? Clearly, not all of the technologies or external resources that we encounter are apt to 
engage in the kind of bio-technological hybridization envisioned by the extended mind hypothesis. 
As Clark (1997) argues: 
“There would be little value in an analysis that credited me with knowing all the facts in 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica just because I paid the monthly installments and found 
space for it my garage” (pg. 217).  
Similarly, we suggest, it would be foolish to equate my personal body of knowledge and beliefs as 
co-extensive with the informational contents of the internet simply because I have an internet-
enabled mobile phone. What, then, are the conditions under which we count a set of external 
resources as constituting part of an environmentally-extended mind? In answering this question, 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) embrace a particular set of criteria, ones that appeal to the accessibility, 
portability, reliability and trustworthiness of the external resource. The criteria are that:  
1.  “…the resource must be available and typically invoked”  (Clark, in press-b). [Availability 
Criterion] 
2.  “…any  information…retrieved  from  *the  non-biological  resource  must]  be  more-or-less 
automatically  endorsed.  It  should  not  usually  be  subject  to  critical  scrutiny  (unlike  the 
opinions  of  other  people,  for  example).  It  should  be  deemed  about  as  trustworthy  as 
something retrieved clearly from biological memory” (Clark, in press-b). [Trust Criterion] 
3.  “…information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required”. 
(Clark, in press-b) [Accessibility Criterion] 
Clearly, such criteria serve to guide and constrain our intuitions about the kind of bio-artifactual and 
bio-technological couplings that are relevant to the formation of an extended mind. And they do so 
precisely because they delimit the range of situations under which we recognize the capabilities 
engendered by an external resource as being (most plausibly) that of a specific individual (or agent). 
In other words, what is important about the various criteria Clark and Chalmers (1998) propose is 
that  they  ensure  that  the  capacities  of  an  environmentally-extended,  bio-technologically  hybrid 
system are most plausibly seen by external observers (and perhaps by the agents themselves – see 
below) as the capacities and features of a particular agent. As Wilson and Clark (2009) suggest: 
“We properly expect our individual agents to be mobile, more or less reliable, bundles of 
stored knowledge and computational, emotional and inferential capacities. So we need to 
be  persuaded  that  the  new  capacities  enabled  by  the  addition  of  the  notebook  are 
likewise  sufficiently  robust  and  enduring  as  to  contribute  to  the  persisting  cognitive 
profile we identify as Otto the agent. The bulk of Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) work was 
an attempt to isolate and defend a specific account of the conditions under which we 
would be justified in identifying such an extended mind.” (pg. 67).  
What Wilson and Clark (2009) are suggesting here, we think, is not that the conditions cited in Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) (the conditions of trust, reliability, portability and so on) are necessary for all 
forms of cognitive extension. Instead, they are suggesting that the conditions apply in the specific 
case of the extended mind, and perhaps even here – although Wilson and Clark (2009) do not The Network-Extended Mind 
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explicitly state it – they are really only relevant to the specific case of dispositional beliefs. What we 
seem  to  confront  then  is  a  set  of  what  might  generally  be  referred  to  as  coupling  conditions, 
conditions  that  determine  when  we  are  and  when  we  are  not  justified  in  identifying  cases  of 
cognitive extension that apply to the realm of folk-psychological theorizing. In all cases of cognitive 
extension, we claim, what is important is a particular pattern of temporally fine-tuned information 
flow and influence within a networked ensemble of diverse resources. This network constitutes the 
mechanistic substrate of an extended cognitive system whenever the objective of that system, or 
the  task  in  which  it  is  engaged,  is  recognizably  cognitive  in  nature  (see  note  7).  However,  this 
networked ensemble need not be permanent in nature. It can be a one-off organization that is 
assembled for the purposes of a specific cognitive task, or it can be a temporary but repeatable 
organization that is assembled to deal with an intermittent or periodically-occurring task (see Wilson 
& Clark, 2009). When the organization is more permanent, we approach the kind of conditions under 
which  we  count  the  external  resource  as  constituting  part  of  the  material  supervenience  base 
associated  with  an  agent’s  daily  patterns  of  psychologically-interesting  behaviour.  These  are 
precisely  the  kind  of  conditions  under  which  we  are  justified  in  seeing  the  emergence  of  an 
environmentally-extended mind. 
The Web-Extended Mind: A Thought (Provoking) Experiment 
Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) original presentation of the extended mind thesis relies on a thought 
experiment involving a simple augmentative resource  – a conventional notebook. It is perfectly 
correct and appropriate to ask whether this notebook is actually the kind of resource that could (in 
virtue of the kinds of human-artefact interaction it supports) fulfil the conditions for an extended 
mind. And, in fact, it is not clear that any actual notebook currently carried by a human agent could 
fulfil the criteria of portability, accessibility, reliability and so on, to the extent required. For all that, 
however, the main point of the notebook case was to highlight the mere possibility of an extended 
mind; it was not meant to suggest that most cases of notebook use actually result in genuine cases 
of cognitive extension. But now that the notions of cognitive extension and the extended mind have 
been fleshed out, we can dispense with such technologically low-grade examples and focus our 
attention on the role played by the rich variety of emerging technologies and resources that we see 
in today’s hi-tech environment, most of them relying, in one form or another, on complex networks 
of information exchange, distribution and transformation. To what extent do ubiquitous modes of 
network-mediated  information  access,  as  well  as  portable  devices  and  wearable  computers, 
contribute  to  the  technological  realization  of  extended  cognitive  systems  and  the  possibility  of 
environmentally-extended minds?  
To pursue this notion in the context of our own research we have posited an extension to the 
original thesis of the extended mind. The thesis is called the thesis of network-enabled cognition 
(Smart,  Engelbrecht,  Braines,  Hendler,  &  Shadbolt,  2008)  (or  more  recently  the  thesis  of  the 
network-extended  mind),  and  it  makes  a  specific  claim  about  the  role  of  network  systems  in 
constituting some parts of an extended computational system, one that is capable of implementing 
cognitive operations and contributing to the realization of certain contentful mental states. The 
thesis is as follows:  
Thesis of the Network-Extended Mind: The technological and informational elements of 
large-scale information and communication networks can, under certain circumstances, The Network-Extended Mind 
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constitute  part  of  the  material  supervenience  base  for  (at  least  some  of)  an  agent’s 
mental states and processes. 
Clearly, one of the things to be assessed in evaluating this thesis is whether the kinds of technologies 
and resources that are being made available as a result of recent research and development in the 
electronics and computer science domains are sufficiently well-suited to meet the kind of criteria 
that Clark and Chalmers (1998) insist are important to the emergence of an extended mind. In some 
of our recent work we have examined this claim with regard to our (currently) best example of a 
large-scale networked information environment, namely the World Wide Web (Smart, Engelbrecht, 
Braines, Strub, & Hendler, 2009). What emerges from this analysis (see also Smart et al., 2008) is 
that, in many cases, the general trend of technological evolution is suitably well-aligned with the 
kind of criteria proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998). Thus, in terms of concerns about portability 
we highlighted the fact that the current state-of-the-art in mobile computing devices has already 
given us devices that are at least as portable as the conventional notebook in Clark and Chalmers’ 
(1998) discussion. Moreover, in terms of the accessibility of information content, it is significant that 
the focus of many research and technology efforts, particularly in the context of the World Wide 
Web, are geared towards improving user access to online information. Work of particular note here 
includes the development of natural language question-answering systems (Lopez, Pasin, & Motta, 
2005;  Tablan,  Damljanovic,  &  Bontcheva,  2008),  user-friendly  semantic  information  browsers 
(schraefel et al., 2005), the use of sub-vocalization techniques to support Web navigation (Jorgensen 
&  Binsted,  2005),  and  the  use  of  intelligent  forward  caching  and  data  charging  mechanisms  to 
mitigate download delays and the effects of intermittent network connectivity (Cherniack, Franklin, 
& Zdonik, 2001). New technologies in the field of wearable computing are also likely to enhance our 
access to information. Mobile device eyewear systems
15, for example, display information directly to 
a  user’s  visual  field  using  conventional  eyewear  equipment  (e.g.  spectacles).  Some  of  the 
applications envisioned for this new technology include location-aware social network services, real-
world  visual  overlays  for  environment  navigation,  battlefield  situation  awareness  displays,  and 
immersive virtual reality systems for education and entertainment. Such systems tend to reduce the 
cost of information access
16, and, we argue, they introduce new ways in which network -accessible 
information content can be co-opted into the information processing loops of cognitively-extended 
agents. 
It is also important to note (and this is where our philosophical interests start to converge with our 
own scientific research programs) that as we move forward into an era of next -generation Web 
technologies,  we  are  witnessing  a  move  away  from  document -centric  modes  of  information 
encoding to more data-centric modes. Document-centric modes of information encoding are those 
typically encountered on the conventional Web, where task-relevant information is often embedded 
in resources such as Web pages, often surrounded by (in many cases) irrelevant or redundant 
information. Think about the problem of accessing factual information from a web -accessible 
resource, such as Wikipedia. Even if the delays associated with document retrieval (i.e. downloading) 
and presentation are resolved, the user is still confronted with the onerous task of surveying the 
                                                           
15 http://www.microvision.com/wearable_displays/index.html 
16 The notion of cost is important here because empirical studies suggest that the cost of accessing information 
from external resources has a significant impact on whether the resource is actually used  (Gray & Fu, 2004). 
Information access cost is typically quantified in terms of temporal considerations, but it is possible that other 
types of consideration (such as physical effort) may also be important. The Network-Extended Mind 
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document for relevant information content. In most cases, this requires the user to scroll through 
the web page and process large amounts of largely irrelevant content in order to identify the small 
amount of information that is actually needed. This is a very inefficient means of information access. 
Even if the user tries to isolate specific information items for use on multiple occasions, they cannot 
do  this  without  reliably  fixing  the  physical  location  of  the  information  (perhaps  by  copying  the 
required information to a local resource
17). 
What is important for the emergence of network-extended minds, we suggest, are flexible modes of 
data integration, aggregation and presentation, in conjunction with an ability to gear information 
retrieval operations to suit the task-specific needs and requirements of particular problem -solving 
contexts.  Such  c apabilities  are  being  progressively  unleashed  by  new  approaches  to  data 
representation and information access on what is (presently) the core technological infrastructure of 
the conventional World Wide Web. Thus notions such as the Semantic Web and Linked  Data
18 
initiatives (Berners-Lee et al., 2006; Berners-Lee, Hendler, & Lassila, 2001; Shadbolt, Hall, & Berners-
Lee,  2006)  countenance  an  approach  to  data  modelling  and  representation  that  is  largely 
independent of specific presentational formats or usage contexts. Commenting on the relationship 
of the Semantic Web to the conventional Web, Berners-Lee et al (2006) write:  
“The SW [Semantic Web] tries to get people to make their data available to others, and 
to add links to make them accessible by link following. So the vision of the SW is an 
extension of Web principles from documents to data.” (pg. 18) 
This shift of emphasis (from linked documents to linked data) is, we suggest, an important milestone 
in enabling the kind of selective data integration, aggregation, and filtering that undergirds the 
emergence  of  cognitively-extended  systems  and  the mechanistic  realization of extended mental 
states. 
To make this vision a little more concrete, we present a thought experiment involving a near-future 
case  of  Web-mediated  information  access  in  the  context  of  a  fully  interactive  (in  the  sense  of 
extended Web 2.0 capabilities), linked data web environment. Imagine that our future (in our case 
cognitively unimpaired) human agent is equipped with a mobile networked device (a mobile phone 
will do), an information presentation device (such as the aforementioned mobile eyewear devices, 
or the memory aids being developed by the Memory Glasses project at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology
19), and a means of controlling info rmation access and navigation in a simple and 
effective manner (for the sake of argument imagine an advanced form of the electromyographic, 
electroencephalographic  and  electrooculographic  interfaces  being  developed  by  a  variety  of 
academic and commercial organizations (Mason, Bashashati, Fatourechi, Navarro, & Birch, 2007; 
Nicolelis, 2001; Pfurtscheller, Scherer, & Neuper, 2007; Stix, 2008) )
20. Thus equipped, our future 
agent is able to retrieve information from the Web, on demand, in a manner that is delicately 
                                                           
17 Links to sections within the page will not work because Wikipedia, like most Web 2.0 applications, features 
dynamic content, and the physical location of specific information items is liable to change across multiple 
usage contexts. 
18 http://linkeddata.org/ 
19 http://www.media.mit.edu/wearables/mithril/memory-glasses.html 
20 This is probably the most problematic aspect of our discussion: how to afford access to and interaction with 
network systems in low-cost ways. We revisit this later on in the discussion about context -aware information 
retrieval (see ‘Human-Centered Cognitive Extension’ section). The Network-Extended Mind 
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geared
21 to shaping, influencing and constraining ongoing sequences of thought and action. Our 
subject could, for example, be guided as to the location of interesting spatial targets by the use of 
simple geo-registered directional indicators overlaid onto the visual field. Our subject would not, 
therefore, have to rely on bio-memory to recall facts, such as the location of the Museum of Modern 
Art, because location-aware services would retrieve and present this information in a way that 
would serve to guide ongoing behaviour. Similarly, imagine that our subject has an interest in 
baseball and that baseball facts and figures are continually posted on the Web in a form that permits 
flexible  forms  of  retrieval,  combination,  aggregation  and  inference  (e.g.  using  the  Resource 
Description Framework
22 or Web Ontology Language
23). In this situation, our subject would be able 
to retrieve any piece of baseball-related information, on demand, in a manner that is robustly and 
continuously available. What, we might wonder, would our scientific, social and (indeed) subjective 
intuitions be in such a situation? Would it be appropriate for us to say that the subject pretty much 
‘knows’ everything there is to know about baseball, at least in terms of the information that is 
posted on the Web? If this claim seems profoundly implausible or inappropriate to you, think for a 
moment  about  what  it  is  that  determines  what  you  think  you  already  know.  What  seems  to 
determine whether we know or do not know something is not the fact that we are continuously, 
consciously aware of relevant facts and figures. What seems to count is more the kind of access we 
have to the relevant information, the fact that when we need to recall the information it is there, 
easily (and sometimes not so easily) made available to us by our bio-memory systems. But need our 
bodies of personal knowledge be so reliant on biologically-based modes of information storage? 
What if our access to externally-located information was just as reliably, easily and continuously 
available as the kind of access afforded by our own bio-memories? It this case, it seems, there is no 
principled reason to suggest that the external information would not count as part of your own 
personal body of knowledge and dispositional beliefs. As Clark (2003) argues: 
“..it  sometimes  makes  both  social  and  scientific  sense  to  think  of  your  individual 
knowledge as quite simply whatever body of information and understanding is at your 
fingertips; whatever body of information and understanding is right there, cheaply and 
easily available, as and when needed.” (pg. 42). 
If this is indeed what it means to know something, then the epistemic implications of our future 
contact  with  network  systems  and  resources  could  be  significant.  For  in  such  situations  the 
boundaries of  what  we  know  seems to  be  limited  only  by  the  accessibility we  have to various 
sources of environmental information, and if that information consists in the sum total of human 
knowledge, as stored in some large-scale networked space, then the epistemic limits of the network-
extended mind are of a scale and potential that surpasses anything we have yet seen in the course 
of human history. What might be the long-term effect of such a cognitively-extended system on our 
familiar notions of knowledge-guided competence? And what might be the effect of such forms of 
epistemic contact on our core notions of who and what we are?  
                                                           
21 In the sense that only relevant information gets presented. The mode of information presentation is also 
important here. In particular, it is important to avoid concerns about information overload (see the section on 
‘Human-Centered  Cognitive  Extension’).  Ideally,  information  should  be  presented  in  the  form  of  simple, 
perhaps subliminal (see DeVaul, Pentland, & Corey, 2005), cues and prompts that serve to guide thought and 
action in cognitively productive ways. 
22 http://www.w3.org/RDF/ 
23 http://www.w3.org/2004/OWL/ The Network-Extended Mind 
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One thing that is worth considering at this point is that a potential shift in our notions of knowledge-
guided competence, as applied to other agents, might also be accompanied by a correlative shift in 
our own subjective impressions of ourselves. In order to make this idea intelligible, think for a 
moment about the light in a refrigerator. If we did not know better we might be inclined to say that 
the light in the refrigerator is always on. Indeed, whenever we open the door to check whether the 
light is on, the light is, in fact, on. It seems to us as though the light is continuously lit because it is lit 
whenever we choose to look at it. In a similar vein, our sense of the detail in a visual scene may be 
attributable to the fact that the details of the scene are always made available to us whenever we 
try to look for them (see Myin & O'Regan, 2009). Our sense of ‘seeing all the detail’ in a visual scene 
is not necessarily because all aspects of the scene are explicitly represented
24; rather, our conscious 
experience of seeing all the detail stems from the fact that we can continually visit and revisit all 
aspects of the scene (by moving our head and eyes) whenever we feel the need to do so. Arguments 
such as this form part of an influential theory of our conscious experience  (Noë, 2004; Noë, 2009; 
O'Regan & Noë, 2001), which emphasizes how our subjective perceptual experiences are dependent 
on an implicit knowledge of sensorimotor dependencies (knowledge or expectations concerning the 
effect of movement or change on sensory stimulation). The claim that we want to make here is that 
this approach to accounting for our conscious experience may also be  relevant in accounting for 
what we ‘feel’ or ‘sense’ we do and do not know. In this case, our sense of what we know would be 
guided by our ability to make knowledge and information available whenever we choose to do so, or 
are required to do so. In a way that is similar to our sense of the detail in a visual scene, we sense 
that we know something because the thing that is known can be easily accessed and co-opted into 
ongoing problem-solving sequences whenever it needs to be so. The claim is that if, by virtue of our 
experiences, we come to learn that certain bodies of information and knowledge (perhaps past 
experiences)  can  be  easily  accessed  at  will,  then  we  will  genuinely  feel  as  if  those  bodies  of 
knowledge and information are part of us, that they are part of our personal body of knowledge and 
experience.  
This touches on an issue that we address in other work (Smart, O'Hara, Engelbrecht, Giammanco, & 
Braines, in press), namely the extent to which ‘our’ memories can be externally-located and perhaps 
even externally-manipulated. What we suggest is that our memories need not always be in the head, 
and if they are not in the head then they can be manipulated in a variety of ways. This notion of 
manipulation touches, of course, on the classic studies in false memory research (e.g. Loftus, 1997), 
but the implications are somewhat broader here. What we suggest is that if our personal memories 
are partially constituted by what is outside the head, then we open up opportunities for radical 
forms of re-personalization, experiential reprogramming and memory configuration. In the extreme 
case, imagine if your sense of what your memories are is partially constituted by your access to 
various sources of external information. Now imagine that if, after some head trauma (or perhaps 
deliberate neurological intervention), you lose all your bio-based memories. Now your memories are 
entirely constituted by what is made available to you by your external cognitive aids. If you wished, 
you could have someone manipulate the information contents of those aids and give you, what is in 
effect, a new set of memories!  
Whether  such  claims  can  be  substantiated  or  not  is  something  that  only  future  research  and 
engineering efforts can address. For now, the main point of our argument is to highlight the mere 
                                                           
24 See Noë (2004) for further discussion on this issue. The Network-Extended Mind 
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logical possibility of some forms of cognitive extension and to explore their implications in terms of 
our  cognitive  capabilities  and  potential.  Such  forms  of  cognitive  extension  are  not  necessarily 
contingent on any radically new forms of science fiction style neural rewiring or neural interfacing 
technology, as has been proposed in other parts of the scientific literature (e.g. Stix, 2008). They are, 
potentially at least, part and parcel of the current trend towards increasingly intimate forms of bio-
technological merger with our best network-enabled devices and network-accessible information 
stores.  They  are,  we  might  say,  intermediate  stopping  points  en  route  to  our  network-enabled 
cognitive destiny. 
What this section has intended to show is that the notion of the extended mind is an important and 
powerful  thesis  when  it  comes  to  understanding  the  potential  impact  of  new  network-enabled 
technologies on our core notions of cognitive capability and knowledge-guided competence. The 
point is not lost on those who embrace an extended mind perspective. Thus Clark (2008) argues:  
“…as we move toward an era of wearable computing and ubiquitous information access, 
the robust, reliable information fields to which our brains delicately adapt their inner 
cognitive routines will surely become increasingly dense and powerful, perhaps further 
blurring  the  boundaries  between  the  cognitive  agent  and  her  best  tools,  props  and 
artifacts.” (pg. 41)  
As  engineers,  interested  in  technology-mediated modes of  cognitive  augmentation,  we  can  and 
should strive to support the emergence of systems that meet the criteria for cognitive and mental 
extension.  The  philosophically-derived  coupling  conditions,  in  this  case,  provide  a  rough  set  of 
criteria  as  to  the  required  performance characteristics  of  putative mind-extending  technologies. 
Such criteria obviously need to be supported by future empirical studies regarding the specific kinds 
of information access that are required to motivate a shift in our social, scientific and (perhaps) 
subjective tendencies regarding the intentional characterization of behaviour. But the conditions 
clearly do provide a set of useful targets for future requirements analysis and requirements-driven 
technology development. 
And what of the role of network scientific analyses and network-theoretic approaches in supporting 
the emergence of network-extended minds? We saw, in the case of extended cognitive systems, 
that network scientific analyses were merited by virtue of their potential to shed new light on the 
emergence, maintenance and operation of circuits supporting cognitive extension. Such merits are 
equally  applicable  when  it  comes  to  understanding  the  contribution  of  information  and 
communication networks to network-extended minds. This is so, even though the nature of the 
external resource (e.g. network-enabled device or network-accessible information resource) may be 
somewhat more dynamic and invested with greater computational potential compared to the kind 
of cognitive artefacts featuring in traditional extended cognition/extended mind accounts. Another 
reason to embrace the network and information sciences in relation to the thesis of the network-
extended mind concerns the contribution such approaches make with respect to the development 
and  configuration  of  new  network-enabled  artefacts  and  networked  environments.  Given  the 
potential for our minds to become partially constituted by external technological resources, it is 
surely important that we seek to design those technologies so as to deliver the best profile of 
cognitive performance capabilities and, in the case of our adversaries, limitations.  The Network-Extended Mind 
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There is a one particular sense in which network-theoretic approaches are perhaps crucial to our 
understanding of the role of new technologies in building network-extended minds. It concerns the 
way in which the integration of external resources into a hybrid cognitive processing routine (one 
that  straddles  the  biological  and  technological  realm)  sometimes  results  in  the  emergence  of 
capabilities and competences that are not reducible to those of the constituent parts. In some of our 
most compelling cases of cognitive extension, the incorporation of an external resource does not 
merely result in the augmentation or enhancement of some well-established ability; it engenders 
entirely new forms of cognitive processing capability. One has only to think of the impact that 
written and spoken forms of language have had on our cognitive profile (see Clark, 2008; chapter 3) 
to appreciate the extent to which our cognitive potential can be transformed following certain forms 
of cognitive merger and integration. And it is here that network science plays another potentially 
significant role. For network science, as a specialized branch of complexity science, is concerned with 
themes of self-organization, emergence and systems-level thinking. This makes it ideally poised to 
deal with cases in which we cannot understand the abilities of an extended cognitive system by a 
process of piecemeal decomposition and additive reassembly. As Wilson and Clark (2009) point out: 
“To understand the integrated operation of the extended-thinking system, created, for 
example, by combining pen, paper, graphics program, and a trained mathematical brain, 
it may be quite insufficient to attempt to understand and then combine the properties of 
pens, graphics programs, paper, and brains.” (pg 73). 
The  reason  why  this  is  inappropriate  is  suggested  by  areas  of  scientific  study  like  cognitive 
neuroscience. Cognitive neuroscience does not try to understand the cognitive capabilities of the 
human brain by exclusively focusing its analysis on the processing potential of individual neurons. 
Instead,  in  order  to  understand  the  contribution of  neurons  to cognitive  phenomena,  cognitive 
neuroscientists embrace the principles of systems-level analysis, thinking and modelling. They do 
this precisely because the capabilities of large neuronal ensembles are not those of the individual 
elements (i.e. neurons) that comprise the ensemble. We properly recognize, in this case, that the 
phenomena of interest  – the ones concerning cognitive processing capabilities  – emerge at the 
systems level. So too when it comes to cases of cognitive extension. We should not necessarily 
assume  that  we  can  study  the  elements  of  an  extended  cognitive  system  in  isolation  from  the 
complex webs of causal influence and informational exchange that effectively couple those elements 
into functionally integrated systemic wholes. For, in many of our most compelling cases of cognitive 
extension, the capabilities of the whole cannot be understood by a simple strategy of componential 
analysis. Network science, as a specialized branch of complexity science, should be at the heart of 
our effort to understand the actual and potential capabilities of network-based bio-technological 
organizations.  
Socially-Extended Cognition 
The discussion so far has focused on how external, technological resources may become integrated 
into extended cognitive systems centered on individual human agents. However, this discussion 
overlooks an important aspect of human cognition – the fact that it is often embedded in complex 
networks  of  social  influence  and  interaction.  What  is  the  relationship  between  technologically-
mediated  forms  of  cognitive  extension  and  forms  of  cognitive  extension  in  which  the  external 
resources consist of other human agents? The Network-Extended Mind 
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In unravelling the notion of socially-extended cognition, there are a number of different perspectives 
that might be taken
25: 
1.  The first is that within a large-scale information and communication network environment 
we might see a variety of socially-derived information resources as contributing to individual 
forms of cognitive extension. This notion of extended cognition is, at best, a weak form of 
socially-extended  cognition.  It  emphasizes  the  role  that  social  interactions  and 
collaborations play with respect to the development and maintenance of external, shared 
resources. However, the resources in question are little more than virtual surrogates, or 
stand-ins, for more direct forms of social contact and communication. 
2.  A stronger form of socially-extended cognition sees other agents as directly constituting the 
supervenience base for individual forms of cognitive extension. In this case, an individual 
human agent (X) would become so tightly coupled with another human agent (Y), from the 
perspective of some cognitive processing routine, that Y would come to constitute part of 
the  machinery  associated  with  X’s  cognitive  profile.  Both  would,  essentially,  become 
integrated into a single cognitive system. Whether the right kind of coupling relationship 
between the agents could ever, in practice, be established is unclear, but some theorists, 
such as Tollefsen (2006), seem favourably inclined to such a view. 
3.  The strongest from of socially-extended cognition is what might be called the group mind or 
collective mind thesis. The idea here is that a group of human agents is so organized (with 
regard  to  the  flow  of  information  and  influence  between  them)  that  the  group  itself 
becomes the bearer of genuine mental states.  
 Clearly,  the  third  of  these  is  the  most  contentious  option,  and  few  theorists  seem  inclined  to 
support it
26. Rather than try to review or progress the philosophical debate surrounding this issue, 
our aim, in the current section, will be to highlight a number of issues and observations that we see 
as most relevant to the future study of network -mediated cognitive processing involving multiple 
human agents. 
Firstly, we suspect that the best way of thinking about socially-extended cognition is in terms of the 
role that contemporary and near-future network systems might have in coordinating the thoughts 
and actions of a group of problem-solving agents. One way of thinking about this is to consider our 
                                                           
25  There  is  also,  potentially  at  least,  another  option  here.  This  is  the  idea  that  cognitive  processes  are 
distributed across the members of a group in such a way that neither individual forms of cognitive extension 
nor collective minds need emerge. Much of the work in distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995a; Tribble, 2005) 
can perhaps be seen in this way. 
26 The key problem in this debate may centre on our ability to ascribe mental constructs  to groups of people – 
groups of people just aren’t the kind of things that behave in ways that warrant thought ascription. Something 
similar may confront individual forms of the extended mind thesis. When we say, for example, that an agent, 
in conjunction with external technologies, solves a particular problem, there is a potential mismatch between 
the system that is causally implicated in the expression of behaviour (the extended cognitive system) and the 
thing to which mentalistic constructs get ascribed (the patterns of behaviour of a specific component of the 
larger system, namely the human agent). Given that beliefs are what gets ascribed to patterns of behaviour, 
and the behaviour that is produced (at least in the case of human agents) always results from proximate 
mechanisms that reside in the biological realm, does this mean that we have an inherent tendency (or bias) to 
always perceive the biological agent as the proper target of mental state ascriptions? Do we have an inherent 
tendency to discount the wider nexus of extra-biological causal influences that ultimately contributes to the 
profile of behaviour warranting thought ascription? The Network-Extended Mind 
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earlier claim that many episodes of externally-directed cognitive processing or intelligence are at 
least partly constructive in nature (recall the role of genes or a spider’s ‘brain’
27 in actively creating 
structures that subsequently contribute to much of the complexity we observe at the phenotypic or 
behavioural level). Can something like this vision be applied to the socio-cognitive realm, the realm 
where cognitive processes are distributed across a network of interacting human agents?  
One way in which the notion might be unpacked is by drawing attention to the way in which many 
cognitively-potent external resources are the creative result of the collective actions of multiple 
individuals. Thus consider the mechanisms that lie at the heart of termites’ abilities to construct 
termite mounds. Much of this ability seems to rely on the use of stigmergic processes (Bonabeau, 
1999; Bonabeau, Dorigo, & Theraulaz, 1999), processes that serve to progressively structure and 
coordinate collective action via the presence of simple external cues. As one termite drops a mud-
ball, it leaves a pheromone marker that encourages other termites to deposit mud-balls nearby. As 
the collection of mud-balls increases in size, so specific architectural structures begin to emerge as 
the result of collective, pheromonally-mediated behaviours (see Camazine et al., 2001; chapter 18). 
The key point about such examples of collective intelligence and self-organization is that they show 
how  the  collective  actions  of  multiple  individuals  can  serve  to  progressively  structure  the 
environment (or at least a key problem-solving resource) in ways that meliorate some aspect of 
individual or collective problem-solving
28.  
Perhaps, in the World Wide Web context, systems like Wikipedia are already good examples of this. 
Such systems highlight the role that networks (in this case physical, communication networks) play 
in enabling individual contributions to assemble complex resources that subsequently constrain, 
influence  and  shape  the  profile  of  individual  (and  p erhaps  collective)  thought  and  action. 
Sometimes, when we are confronted with such resources, we are enabled to pursue cognitive goals 
that would be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish by ourselves. An illustrative example of this 
may be the way in which scientific open access initiatives
29, in conjunction with global information 
networks, serve to facilitate creative insight and intellectual progress in the domain of scientific 
endeavour. As Stevan Harnad (1999) rightly notes, the Web allows us to accomplish something akin 
to ‘scholarly skywriting’ – scientific theories, thoughts, ideas, experimental results, and sometimes 
data, are made available in ways that are increasingly accessible to fellow academics and scientific 
colleagues. It is almost as if the outputs of scientific and intellectual enquiry were written in the sky 
for all to see.  
One idea that we want to canvass here is that the key virtue of this mode of information distribution 
and dissemination is that it effectively establishes linkages between ideas, thoughts and concepts 
that would otherwise have been too widely separated to be linked by agents engaged in individual 
forms  of  reason-constrained  thought  and  inference.  Imagine,  for  example,  that  many  of  the 
scientifically-interesting ideas which we are capable of entertaining are the  nodes in a complex 
network whose linkages correspond to the individual transitions in a reason-respecting chain of 
thought. Paths through this network of ideas would then correspond to the intellectual arguments 
                                                           
27 Technically, the spider does not have a brain; its central nervous system is composed of a number of ganglia, 
of which the most prominent are the supraesophagal and subesophagal ganglia. 
28 Within the domain of computer science, the notion of stigmergy informs many approaches to complex 
problems concerning optimization, coordination and self-organization (see Ajith, Crina, & Vitorino, 2006). 
29 http://www.eprints.org/openaccess/ The Network-Extended Mind 
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or theses that flow from some set of initial ideas, assumptions or observations. Such models, while 
perhaps faithful depictions of the inference chains of classical expert systems, seem congenitally ill-
suited to capturing much of our human potential for creativity and insight. Perhaps this is because 
such models overlook the fact that our intellectual excursions are not limited to logically-constrained 
trajectories through a space of scientific ideas (an idea space); instead, at least in some cases, we are 
able to jump around in this space by virtue of our exposure to the thoughts and ideas of others. This, 
in  conjunction  with  our  ability  to  combine  slow,  deliberative  forms  of  rational  thought  with  a 
capacity  for  analogical  reasoning  and  abstract  pattern  matching,  enables  us  to  effectively  form 
conduits or shortcuts
30 to distant parts of the idea space, parts that would have been too distant or 
disconnected to be linked by individual (and socially-unaided) modes of exploration and search. The 
vision, then, is one of networks enabling individuals to exp loit and benefit from mechanisms of 
collective search, establishing new trails through a space of ideas, some of which may, on occasion, 
result in discontinuous steps forward in scientific thinking, innovation and discovery.   
In addition to the role of ne tworks in supporting the collective creation of cognitively -potent 
artefacts and resources, there is a body of empirical research that draws close attention to the role 
of network structures in influencing collective problem -solving abilities. This researc h seeks to 
illuminate the specific role that factors like network topology play in enabling groups of problem -
solving agents to make effective decisions and discover optimal solutions to problems. In one study 
involving human subjects, Mason, Jones and Gol dstone  (2005)  explored the effect of different 
network topologies (e.g. small-world, random, full-connected, etc.) on the ability of groups of people 
to correctly guess a randomly selected number between 1 and 100. On each trial of the experiment, 
subjects attempted to guess the target number and were provided with fe edback about the 
correctness/accuracy of their own response, as well as the responses of their immediate neighbours 
in the network (i.e. the human subjects to which they were directly connected). Mason et al  (2005) 
found that when subjects were given simple problems involving a single target number, the fully 
connected networks were most effective in enabling groups to collectively settle on the correct 
solution. However, when the problem was more complex and involved a three -peaked payout 
function (one optimal solution and two sub -optimal solutions), the networks with   the longest 
average path lengths were the most effective in enabling groups to find the optimal solution. 
Summarizing these results, Goldstone, Roberts and Gureckis (2008) conclude: 
“Problem  spaces  requiring  substantial  exploration  may  benefit  from  networks  with 
mostly locally connected individuals. The problem with fully connected networks is that 
everybody ends up knowing the same information, and they thereby become too like-
minded,  acting  like  a  single  explorer  rather  than  like  a  federation  of  independent 
explorers.”  
Similar results to these have been reported by Lazer and Friedman (2007), who conducted studies 
with synthetic agents, again using different network topologies. Their results suggest that when 
agents  are  dealing  with  complex  problems,  the  more  efficient  the  network  is  at  disseminating 
information, the better the short-run performance of the system (relative to network structures that 
are  less  efficient  at  disseminating  information).  However,  as  the  performance  of  the  system  is 
                                                           
30 Such conduits may, in some sense, be akin to the short-cuts in small-world networks (Watts & Strogatz, 
1998). The shortcuts reduce the path length between our current thoughts and ideas and those that are 
remote, or even impossible, to reach by virtue of reason-constrained forms of inference. The Network-Extended Mind 
 
28 
 
monitored across time, those network structures that are less efficient at disseminating information 
are able to deliver better performance outcomes. In essence, the more efficient networks are better 
at solving problems under heavy time-constraints; however, when temporal considerations are not 
so  important,  the  less  efficient  networks  are  able  to  deliver  better  long-term  performance 
outcomes.  
We  thus  encounter  strong  support  for  the  claim  that  networks  supporting  rapid  information 
dissemination  (small-world  and  fully-connected  networks)  are  more  suitable  for  what  might  be 
called simple or ‘high-tempo’ problems. This contrasts with the case where the problem to be solved 
is more difficult and can be tackled at a more leisurely rate. In this case, more locally-connected 
network structures may be preferable. The reason for sub-optimal performance (at least on difficult 
problems) in groups connected by low average path length networks (e.g. small-world networks) 
seems to centre on the group’s tendency to prematurely settle on sub-optimal solutions – to  be 
drawn into sub-optimal solution outcomes on the basis of initial shared information. Such results are 
of potential relevance to a number of findings in the social psychological literature. They include the 
phenomena  of  groupthink  (Janis,  1982),  production  blocking  (Diehl  &  Stroebe,  1987)  and  the 
common knowledge effect (Stasser & Titus, 1985)
31, all of which  seem to be characterized by a 
group’s inability to find optimal solutions based on some form of precipitant interaction or early 
information sharing. 
The empirical results of Mason et al (2005) and Lazer and Friedman (2007) are important because 
they  highlight  two  things  about  the  role  of  networks  in  socio-cognitive  processing.  Firstly,  the 
suitability of a particular network structure to enable a group of problem-solving agents to reach an 
optimal solution outcome may depend on both the nature of the task in which the group is engaged 
as well as the structure of the solution landscape. Secondly, the differential effectiveness of the 
network structure in supporting certain group-level outcomes may be accounted for by variables, 
such as the rate of information dissemination, that depend as much on the dynamic, time-variant 
functional connectivity of the network, as they do its static, structural characteristics. In respect of 
this  latter  issue,  note  that  just  because  a  network  structure  supports  rapid  information 
dissemination this does not mean that the actual flow of information through the network must be 
necessarily rapid. Agents or nodes within the network can effectively modulate the speed with 
which  information  is  transmitted  by  selectively  ignoring  information,  or  by  only  intermittently 
processing information (in fact this was precisely one of the manipulations employed by Lazer & 
Friedman (2007)). In human networks, there are clearly a variety of factors that might contribute to 
the rate of information distribution. These include things such as the tendency to hoard information, 
willingness to cooperate, vulnerability to copying/transmission errors
32, and trust. Also, of course, in 
                                                           
31 Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath (1997) have also highlighted some of the dangers associated with a group’s over-
reliance on shared information. Such insights, in combination with the results reported here, should give us 
pause  for  thought  when  it  comes  to  notions  of  shared  situation  awareness  (Nofi,  2000)  and  shared 
understanding (Smart, Huynh et al., 2009). Inasmuch as the interventions used to enhance shared situation 
awareness and shared understanding depend on the sharing of common sets of information, it is important 
that we do not create a situation in which group-level problem-solving abilities are undermined as a result of 
trying to achieve some other human factors objective. 
32 Lazer & Friedman (2007) evaluated the impact of copying errors in their computer simulation studies. They 
report that, in the long-run, systems with high error rates in the copying process outperformed those in which 
copying errors were minimized. The explanation for these results seems to be the same as that proposed for 
the  effect  of  network  structure  on  performance,  namely  that  “Error  rates  in  copying….alter  the  balance The Network-Extended Mind 
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situations involving mobile ad hoc networks many nodes may be expected to have only occasional 
and intermittent connectivity, and this may effectively impede the spread of information between all 
network nodes.  
The studies on socio-cognitive processing in group situations highlights the relevance of network 
scientific  approaches  to  our  understanding  about  how  to  analyze  and  engineer  network 
environments so as to best support collaborative problem-solving and decision-making. There is 
clearly much more work to be done here, but one thing does seem relatively clear at this early stage: 
it is that the kinds of information and network-theoretic approaches we advocated in the case of 
individual forms of cognitive extension (i.e. extended webs of information flow and influence spun 
around individual human agents), are readily applicable to the study of systems in which the webs of 
information  flow  and  influence  subtend  multiple  agents.  Whether  one  wants  to  refer  to  such 
systems as socially-extended cognitive systems, or group minds, is, to our mind at least, largely 
irrelevant (although much may depend on whether we recognize some higher-level agency to which 
cognitive states and processes can be readily ascribed – see note 26). What seems important is that 
cognitive processing can take place in group situations, and that much of it can be supported by 
features of the network structure that acts to mediate group interactions. In such situations, the 
tools, principles and techniques of information and network science are just as relevant to our 
ultimate  understanding  of  the  cognitive  capabilities  of  social  organizations  as  they  are  to  our 
understanding of extended cognitive systems involving individual human agents.  
Extended Cognitive Systems and Military Coalitions 
In  considering  the  possibility  of  cognitive  extension  in  military  coalition  environments,  we  can 
discern two distinct ways in which cognition may be extended beyond the bounds of individual 
human agents. One of these forms of cognitive extension is centered on the individual human agent. 
It  sees  the  cognitive  capabilities  of  the  human  agent  as,  in  part,  realized  by  complex  webs  of 
information  flow  and  influence  between  a  variety  of  inner  (biological)  and  outer  (social, 
technological and  informational)  resources.  This  is  the  form  of  cognitive  extension  that  is most 
commonly encountered in the philosophical and scientific literature, and it is the form of cognitive 
extension that has occupied us for most of the current chapter. There is, however, a second way in 
which cognitive processes may be extended beyond the biological borders of specific individuals. 
This is the form of cognitive extension that we encounter in cases of distributed cognition research 
(Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b; Tribble, 2005). It emphasizes the way in which cognitive processes inhere 
in the complex webs of information processing that connect multiple human agents with a variety of 
non-biological  props,  aids  and  artefacts.  This  form  of  multi-agent  cognitive  extension  can  be 
discriminated from individual forms by virtue of the emphasis placed on the larger socio-technical 
system in which much of the relevant cognitive processing is deemed to occur. Thus, while individual 
forms of cognitive extension focus on the individual human agent as the target system of interest, 
the distributed cognition movement tends to see the larger socio-technical system as the relevant 
unit of cognitive analysis. Relative to this larger system, the activities of individual human agents 
form part of a complex web of coordinated computational activity, one that serves to propagate and 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
between exploration and exploitation in the system, increasing the amount of experimentation but reducing 
the rate with which successful strategies spread” (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). The Network-Extended Mind 
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transform  representations  in  ways  that  ultimately  lead  to  coherent  patterns  of  system-level 
behaviour. 
These two forms of cognitive extension are, we suggest, highly relevant to our understanding of 
coalition-based cognitive capabilities. Although the multi-agent form of cognitive extension might, at 
first glance, seem more interesting and relevant from the perspective of military coalitions (not least 
because it affords an opportunity to see entire military coalitions as functionally integrated cognitive 
systems),  we  suggest  that  both  forms  of  cognitive  extension  are,  in  fact,  important  foci  of 
philosophical and scientific attention. The reason for this is that we see the global effectiveness of a 
military coalition as dependent (at least in part) on the cognitive capabilities of both individual 
soldiers and the wider socio-technical systems in which these soldiers are embedded. Increases in 
cognitive productivity at the individual level, as produced by cognitive extension, may be magnified 
many times once such human-centered extended systems are combined and integrated into larger 
webs  of  collective  cognitive  processing.  In  both  cases  (of  individual  and  collective  cognitive 
processing), our understanding of how to create, configure and maintain multiple types of networks 
in ways that best serve the information processing objectives of the larger coalition organization is of 
paramount importance. 
In  this  section  we  review  the  opportunities  and  challenges  for  cognitive  extension  in  military 
coalitions, focusing exclusively on the two forms of cognitive extension identified above. The section 
on  ‘Human-Centered  Cognitive Extension’  reviews  issues  and  research  associated  with  cognitive 
extension at the level of the individual soldier or warfighter; the section on ‘Coalitions as Extended 
Cognitive Systems’ explores the opportunities for cognitive extension at the level of entire military 
coalitions (or at least significant elements thereof). 
Human-Centered Cognitive Extension 
The notion of human-centered cognitive extension is simply the notion of cognitive extension that 
has  occupied  us  for  much  of  the  current  chapter.  It  is  the  idea  that  the  physical  machinery 
underpinning at least some of the cognitive capabilities of an individual human agent need not 
necessarily  reside  in  the head  of  the  human  agent.  In  understanding  how  to  support  cognitive 
extension at the individual human level, we have argued that we should focus on the nature of the 
relationships  between  the  human  agent  and  network-accessible  information  resources.  Thus,  in 
order  for  human-centered  extended  cognitive  systems  to  emerge,  we  need  to  ensure  that  the 
appropriate channels of information flow and influence are established between the human agent 
and the surrounding nexus of cognitively-relevant social, technological and informational scaffolding. 
One of the most important issues here concerns the bi-directional exchange of information between 
individual  soldiers  and  other  (non-biological)  elements  of  the  extended  cognitive  system.  In 
particular, we need to ensure that the information provided by some external resource is sufficiently 
poised to guide response selection and response execution processes in adaptive and intelligent 
ways. Furthermore, the biological elements of the soldier-centered cognitive hybrid need to be 
appropriately interfaced with the non-biological elements such that the hybrid system can function 
as a single functionally-integrated cognitive whole. What this means, in practice, is the deployment 
of technologies that work in concert with the human agent – technologies that are sensitive and 
responsive to aspects of human psycho-biological functioning, and which are capable of adapting 
their functional profile to meet the problem-solving goals and objectives of the larger hybrid system. 
Research  programs  such  as  the  DARPA-funded  Augmented  Cognition  program  and  the  recently The Network-Extended Mind 
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announced Cognition and Neuroergonomics CTA both boast scientific and technology development 
goals that are directly aligned with these requirements. 
One  problem  that  seems  particularly  pertinent  to  the  possibility  of  human-centered  forms  of 
cognitive extension concerns the way in which human agents are enabled to play an active role in 
the retrieval, structuring and transformation of information from non-biological sources. Thus, recall 
that in many cases of cognitive extension (see the earlier section on ‘Cognitive Extension’) what we 
seem to encounter are feedback-loops that involve the active manipulation of an external resource 
by a core biological agent. Recall, also, the thought experiment discussed in the section on ‘The 
Web-Extended Mind: A Thought (Provoking) Experiment’. This thought experiment was intended to 
provide a vision of the impact of near-future technologies on our traditional notions of knowledge-
guided  competence  at  the  scientific,  social  and  (perhaps)  subjective  levels.  But  of  all  the 
technological  elements  described  as  part  of  that  thought  experiment,  one  element  emerges  as 
particularly  problematic  with  respect  to  the  current  state-of-the-art.  This  is  the  way  in  which 
information retrieval operations (from bio-external media) are initiated and controlled by the human 
agent.  In  the  thought  experiment,  we  discussed  the  use  of  complex  sensor  devices  that  were 
sensitive to minute patterns of muscular or neural activity. However, the current functionality of 
such devices is limited, and it is not always clear that they can be used to good effect across different 
situations.  In  the  military  context,  for  example,  soldiers  are  typically  engaged  in  highly  intense 
physical activity, and such activity interferes with the controlled and deliberate expression of both 
muscular  and  neural  response  profiles.  Ongoing  work  within  the  DARPA-funded  Augmented 
Cognition program, as well as the forthcoming Cognition and Neuroergonomics CTA, may help to 
address  some  of  these  issues  (see  Relevant  Defence-Related  Research  Programs’),  but,  in  the 
meantime, what other strategies might we pursue in order to support the retrieval and presentation 
of information in ways conducive to the emergence of network-extended minds? 
One  potentially  relevant  line  of  research  here  concerns  the  attempt  to  support  context-aware 
modes of just-in-time information retrieval (Bahrami, Yuan, Smart, & Shadbolt, 2007; Rhodes & 
Maes, 2000). This research seeks to proactively present relevant information by monitoring specific 
aspects of the task or environmental context. Complementing this research effort is work in the ITA 
program that seeks to monitor and infer mission status information on the basis of both physical and 
contextual cues (Poltrock, Handel, Bowyer, & Waggett, 2008). Importantly, once we are able to 
detect features of the problem-solving context, we are able to proactively disseminate information 
to  individual  agents  in  ways  that  supports  the  effective  realization  of  individual  and  collective 
problem-solving goals. Clearly, our ability to dynamically configure the physical network in a way 
that supports this mode of context-sensitive information distribution is of vital importance (see 
‘Coalitions as Extended Cognitive Systems’), as is our ability to create and exploit representations of 
(e.g.) coalition plans (Mott & Hendler, 2007) that could be used to control information distribution 
and adapt communication network topologies. 
One  concern  in  relation  to  network-mediated  forms  of  information  retrieval  and  presentation 
involves the notorious problem of information overload. In this sense, network access is both a boon 
and a burden. It is a boon inasmuch as it creates new opportunities for situation awareness and 
improved decision-making, but it is a burden inasmuch as it runs the risk of overwhelming the 
capacity of the individual human agent to adaptively exploit available information in the context of 
ongoing decision-making processes. There are a number of lines of research that might be pursued The Network-Extended Mind 
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here. One strategy is to rely on the aforementioned mechanism of context-sensitive information 
retrieval to limit the amount of information that is presented to a user  (Bahrami et al., 2007). 
Another is to rely on alert and notification systems that can be tailored to a user’s specific goals, 
interests and concerns (Smart, Russell et al., 2009). There is also an important body of research that 
concerns the use of subliminal
33 cuing techniques to influence behavioural output  (DeVaul et al., 
2005). Such techniques are important because they provide a route to behavioural influence that 
does not involve conscious processing. 
One question that we should ask in light of these ongoing research efforts is the extent to which the 
various  technological  add -ons,  changes  in  information  accessibility  and  so  on,  are  genuinely 
enhancing or augmenting the cognitive capabilities of a particular human agent. The answer to th is 
question is perhaps not quite as straightforward as it might initially seem, especially since there is 
nothing in the bedrock claims of the extended mind thesis to suggest that all cases of cognitive 
extension  need  to  be  uniformly  beneficial  from  a  perf ormance  perspective.  Indeed,  some 
commentators have suggested that network technologies may have a somewhat negative impact on 
human cognitive processing (e.g. Carr, 2008; Greenfield, 2003). Carr (2008), for example, bemoans 
the apparent impact the Web is having on his cognitive capabilities: 
“As the media theorist Marshall McLuhan pointed out in the 1960s, media are not just 
passive channels of information. They supply the stuff of thought, but they also shape the 
process of thought. And what the Net seems to be doing is chipping away at my capacity 
for concentration and contemplation. My mind now expects to take in information the 
way the Net distributes it: in a swiftly moving stream of particles. Once I was a scuba 
diver in the sea of words. Now I zip along the surface like a guy on a jet ski” (Carr, 
2008; pg 57). 
Clearly, we should not assume that such anecdotal reports provide any insight into the Web’s true 
effects  on  human  cognitive  functioning
34. Nevertheless, the cautionary flavour of Carr ’s  (2008) 
                                                           
33 Subliminal in this context means a perceptual cue that is presented at a level of intensity or duration below 
that necessary for it to become part of conscious awareness.  
34 One reason to be cautious of such claims is that the extended mind thesis obliges us to take a systems -level 
perspective when thinking about the capabilities of network -extended cognitive systems. Thus, just because 
some aspect of the psycho-cognitive functioning of an individual seems to have been altered as a result of a 
specific  biotechnological  merger,  this  does  not  mean  that  those  capabilities  (or  extensions  of  those 
capabilities) are not manifest at the system level. To put this into context, think about the r ole that language 
plays in augmenting our cognitive capabilities  (see Clark, 2008; chapter 3). It may well be that human agents 
are increasingly delegating many of their cognitive burdens to the Web, but is this really any different from the 
role that written and spoken forms of language already play for us? No one, we suspect, would be comfortable 
with the claim that we should abandon written forms of language because they undermine the (pure) 
cognitive  integrity  of  the  ‘real’  environmentally-decoupled  human  agent.  And  this  is  not  just  because 
individually and collectively we are better off, in a cognitive sense, for the development of writing systems. It is 
because such innovations are now so deeply integrated into our everyday problem-solving routines that the 
very notion of establishing a neat separation between the true capabilities of the human agent and their 
language-infected  capabilities  seems  untenable.  Many  of  us,  we  suspect,  feel  that  linguistically-enabled 
capabilities are an intrinsic part of our own personal cognitive repertoire. We see language as less a form of 
technological enhancement  and more an aspect of our  own idiosyncratic cognitive  profile.  The long-term 
vision of the network-extended mind theorist is no different in this respect. The vision is that as network 
technologies become more permanent, reliable and accessible, so they will become increasingly integrated 
into our cognitive self image – our image of who we are and what we are capable of. The Network-Extended Mind 
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commentary is well taken, and, pending further research, we should perhaps be somewhat cautious 
of the kind of bio-technological unions we make ourselves susceptible to. 
Aside from the potential negative effects of cognitive extension on human cognitive performance, it 
is not always clear that technologically-mediated forms of cognitive extension should always be 
considered augmentative, even when the presence of such technologies seems to bolster cognitive 
performance. The reason for this, we suggest, is that the boundaries of the extended cognitive 
system are not the same as the boundaries of the individual human cognitive agent, and, inasmuch 
as the cognitive performances in question are attributed to the extended cognitive system (rather 
than the cognitive agent), it may be inappropriate to regard the capabilities of the human agent as 
significantly altered by the emergence of environmentally-extended cognitive circuits. Here we see a 
potential  tension  with  regard  to  notions  of  cognitive  agency  and  the  physical  machinery  that 
supports cognitive processing. When the mechanisms supporting a particular cognitive performance 
extend beyond the biological boundaries of an individual human agent, then we arguably confront a 
genuine case of cognitive extension. However, it is not always clear, in such cases, that the cognitive 
capabilities of the larger, mechanistically-extended cognitive system should always be equated with 
those  of  the  individual,  biologically-bounded,  human  agent.  Something  along  these  lines  may 
underlie the apparent confusion in the philosophical and cognitive scientific literature concerning 
the augmentative status of a number of cognitive technologies. Thus, while many commentators talk 
of external resources acting to augment or enhance human memory, Hutchins (1995b) suggests that 
we should not see such resources as enhancing the memory of individual human agents per se; 
rather,  we  should  see  the  augmented  capabilities  as  those  of  a  new  human-technology  hybrid 
system. For example, in discussing the way speed bugs
35 contribute to memory functions in an 
airplane cockpit, Hutchins (1995b) argues: 
“Individual pilot memory has not been enhanced; rather, the memory function has now 
become a property of a larger system in which the individual engages in a different sort 
of cognitive behavior...To call speed bugs a 'memory aide' for the pilots is to mistake the 
cognitive properties of the reorganized functional system for the cognitive properties of 
one of its human components. Speed bugs do not help pilots remember speeds; rather, 
they are part of the process by which the cockpit system remembers speeds.” (pg. 282-
283) 
Such views serve to remind us that issues of cognitive extension cannot necessarily be divorced from 
ones of cognitive agency. In attempting to understand the extent to which the cognitive capabilities 
of agents are enhanced (or undermined) as a result of particular bio-technological mergers, we may 
need to account for how the boundaries of specific cognitive agents are identified and how the 
cognitive capabilities of those agents get ascribed.  
Coalitions as Extended Cognitive Systems 
In addition to seeing cognitive extension as something that can take place at the individual, human 
agent level, it is also possible (on occasion) to see much larger systems, comprising multiple agents 
and material artefacts, as extended cognitive systems. The distributed cognition movement, for 
example, seeks to account for the performance of large-scale socio-technical systems in terms of the 
interactions  of  multiple  human  agents  with  a  surrounding  nexus  of  social,  technological  and 
                                                           
35 A speed bug is an indicator that highlights specific speeds on a airspeed instrument panel. The Network-Extended Mind 
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informational resources (Hutchins, 1995a, 1995b; Tribble, 2005). Within such systems, the cognitive 
capabilities  of  the  individual  human  agent  are  important  but,  by  themselves,  they  are  often 
inadequate in terms of accounting for the real targets of scientific enquiry: the systemic cognitive 
properties of the larger system.  
The notion that large-scale socio-technical systems may be seen (and analyzed) as cognitive systems 
in their own right has been championed by the cognitive anthropologist Edwin Hutchins. In his 
studies of both ship navigation (Hutchins, 1995a) and airplane piloting (Hutchins, 1995b), Hutchins 
makes it clear that the proper focus of cognitive scientific attention is not always the individual 
human agent; often it is the larger system of social and technological resources in which the human 
agent is embedded. In cases where we seek to understand the cognitive capabilities of a single 
human  agent,  of  course,  this  perspective  reduces  to  the  case  of  individual  forms  of  cognitive 
extension  (cases  where  the  cognitive  capabilities  of  an  individual  human  agent  are  of  primary 
interest).  But  in  a  range  of  cases  the  cognitive  system  in  question  is  composed  of  a  larger 
aggregation of human agents working together in support of some common or shared goal, and it is 
in these cases that a consideration of entire military coalitions as extended cognitive systems seems 
most appropriate. 
Of course, just because we confront a system in which cognitive processing is distributed across a 
much broader nexus of resources than is the case for individual forms of cognitive extension, this 
does not mean that the kind of coupling conditions we saw as relevant in the case of individual 
forms of cognitive extension are not equally important in the case of more distributed cognitive 
systems. Recall our core claims about the importance of functional integration in the case of human-
centered extended cognitive systems:    
What seems to be important then in the case of cognitive extension is that we confront a 
set  of  distinct  components  (brain,  body  and  worldly  elements)  that  are  connected 
together  in  such  a  way  that  their  functional  inter-operation  makes  them  part  of  a 
functionally-integrated (yet internally differentiated) whole. In other words, what seems 
to be important is the specific way in which the components cooperate in the processing 
and exchange of information for the purposes of accomplishing some specific task or 
objective, a task that we typically identify as the responsibility of a specific agent (in 
most cases, an individual human agent). What makes something a part of an extended 
cognitive  system,  we  claim,  relates  to  the  details  of  the  functional  connectivity  and 
patterns of information flow and influence that characterize the inter-operation of the 
various system components. It is in precisely this sense that we conceive of an extended 
cognitive system as consisting of a network of heterogeneous elements, each of which 
makes  a  specific  functional  contribution  to  the  shape  and  profile  of  the  cognitive 
performances manifest by the larger system. 
Much the same can be said when we confront a large-scale distributed cognitive system. Although it 
is not always clear that we can talk of such distributed systems as cognitive agents (at least in the 
same kind of way that we talk of human beings as cognitive agents), it does seem that the same kind 
of functional integration and coordination of the various system components is important to the 
cognitive outputs of the system. And just as we advocated the use of network scientific approaches 
in the case of human-centered cognitive extension, so it is important, we argue, to apply the tools 
and  techniques  of  the  information  and  network  sciences  to  the  case  of  large-scale  distributed The Network-Extended Mind 
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cognitive systems, ones in which a variety of biological and technological elements cooperate in 
producing globally-coherent patterns of systemic behaviour. 
One reason why network-based analyses are important when it comes to military coalition systems 
is that such systems are typically seen as composites of multiple interacting and interconnected 
networks (i.e. a network of networks). The relationships between human agents, for example, may 
be seen as forming one kind of network (e.g. a social network), while the relationships between 
elements of the physical communication infrastructure may be seen as forming a different kind of 
network (i.e. a communication network). Importantly, the various types of network one sees in a 
coalition environment interact in highly complex ways, and we may expect the systemic cognitive 
capabilities  of  a  coalition-based  cognitive  system  to  depend  greatly  on  the  adaptive  alignment 
between the disparate networks. Inasmuch as systemic cognitive performances are influenced by 
the structure and dynamics of the various networks comprising a military coalition system, then such 
networks can, we suggest, be seen as candidate elements of the cognitive machinery for coalition-
based distributed cognitive systems. 
Given the interdependencies between (e.g.) information, communication and human networks in 
coalition  environments,  we  expect  to  see  an  important  role  for  studies  that  shed  light  on  the 
adaptive  configuration  of  such  networks  throughout  the  course  of  coalition  deployments.  One, 
relatively simple, example of this is the case where we seek to change the topology of physical 
communication networks in order to promote the appropriate exchange and transfer of information 
between spatially-distributed coalition elements. Another example is the case where we seek to 
modify the human social network in order to bring people with different (albeit related) bodies of 
knowledge and expertise together in order to solve some specific problem (see Huang, Contractor, & 
Yao, 2008).  In  all cases, what  seems  to  be  important  is  an  ability  to  dynamically  configure  the 
structure and activity of multiple networks so as to best support the realization of organization-level 
or system-level goals.  
The  importance  of  dynamic  configuration  and  functional  coordination  is  recognized  by  those 
working in the area of distributed cognitive systems: 
“In distributed cognition, one expects to find a system that can dynamically configure 
itself to bring subsystems into coordination to accomplish various functions.” (Hollan et 
al., 2000; pg. 175) 
Interestingly, this is a view that is echoed by the cognitive scientist, Marvin Minsky, in his book The 
Society of Mind (Minsky, 1986). Minksy argues that the human mind can be seen as a large system of 
experts or agencies that are dynamically assembled together in various ways in order to accomplish 
specific cognitive tasks. Of course, one issue that is particularly difficult to resolve here concerns the 
mechanisms that support the dynamic configuration of networks, or network elements, in ways that 
best support the realization of cognitive goals. Ideally, network structures within military coalition 
environments should be capable of automatic modes of adaptation in order to ensure that the 
various  elements  of  the  coalition  network  are  functionally  aligned  with  respect  to  force-level 
objectives. What kind of system could support such automatic modes of adaptive configuration in 
coalition networks?  The Network-Extended Mind 
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Perhaps one way of answering this question is to turn to biology and examine the kind of solutions 
that nature has derived for managing information flows in large-scale network systems. Van Essen, 
Anderson and Olshausen (1994), for example, posit the existence of ‘control neurons’ in the brain of 
mammalian  nervous  systems  whose  function  is  to  regulate  information  flows  between  various 
neural processing resources. Such regulation constitutes, they argue, a key mechanism by which we 
are  able  to  adaptively  focus  attention  on  specific  subsets  of  environmental  information  and 
efficiently organize action output in the face of competing motor commands. Their analogy is with 
the  division  of  labour  in  a  large-scale  commercial  organization  in  which  the  key  focus  of 
organizational activity is not the actual generation of the final product per se, but rather the internal 
trafficking of information and materials. Perhaps, therefore, some of the insights gleaned from this, 
and other nature-inspired solutions to the problem of automatic network configuration, could be 
applied to case of network configuration in military coalition systems. 
Other challenges posed by a consideration of coalition-level forms of cognitive extension arise from 
the  cultural,  linguistic  and  technological  differences  between  coalition  force  elements.  One 
challenge,  for  example,  relates  to  the  need  to  ensure  a  common  (or  shared)  understanding  of 
informational cues against a backdrop of community-specific interpretational biases and linguistic 
conventions (see Smart, Huynh et al., 2009). A lack of shared understanding may compromise the 
functional integration of coalition system components and thereby contribute to a breakdown in 
collective cognitive processing. Indeed, a sufficient level of shared understanding may be deemed to 
be one of the factors that determines whether the coalition formation can operate as an extended 
cognitive  system.  Similar  threats  to  functional  integration  stem  from  problems  associated  with 
information exchange, trust and technological compatibility.  
Relevant Defence-Related Research Programs 
This section is not available for viewing. Please purchase the book in which this chapter appears in 
order to gain access to the complete text. Copies of the book can be purchased from Amazon.co.uk. 
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/Network-Science-Military-Coalition-Operations/dp/1615208550).  
Conclusion 
The traditional view in cognitive science is that cognition is inside the head of individual human 
agents. In contrast to this view, the notion of cognitive extension maintains that, at least in some 
situations, cognition is extended beyond the traditional biological borders of skin and skull. This 
latter view draws on an emerging wealth of empirical data concerning in way in which the facts of 
material  embodiment  and  environmental  embedding  contribute  to  the  emergence  of  cognitive 
processing routines that are distributed across the brain, body and world. In this chapter, we have 
suggested  that  notions  of  cognitive  extension  can  be  used  to  understand  the  transformative 
potential of a variety of network-enabled devices and network-accessible information resources on 
human cognitive processing. We have also proposed an extension to the original extended mind 
thesis, one that specifically caters for the potential role of network systems in extending the bounds 
of human cognition.  The Network-Extended Mind 
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Our review of the literature relating to cognitive extension and the extended mind has highlighted a 
number of ways in which the information and network sciences are relevant to our understanding of 
extended cognitive systems. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: 
1.  Extended cognitive systems consist of networks of information flow and influence between a 
variety of heterogeneous resources. Network science is well suited to assist us with the 
project  of  understanding  how  extended  cognitive  circuits  operate  with  respect  to  the 
cognitive capabilities of the larger systemic organization. 
2.  Network-based  approaches  are  merited  in  the  specific  case  of  network-extended  minds 
because physical networks are at the heart of contemporary technology-mediated forms of 
cognitive  extension.  Our  future  attempts  at  engineering  network-extended  cognitive 
systems, or at least enabling them to emerge, will be dictated by our ability to develop and 
configure network technologies in ways that expand our human cognitive potential. 
3.  As a specialized branch of complexity science, network scientific approaches can help us 
understand the emergent capabilities of extended cognitive systems. Given the complex, 
nested  and  non-linear  interactions  between  the  components  of  an  extended  cognitive 
system,  the  capabilities  of  the  larger  system  are  not  always  guaranteed  to  be  mere 
augmentations or enhancements of some existing capability; they can sometimes be entirely 
new forms of cognitive capability and competence. 
The application of network scientific approaches to both the analysis and engineering of extended 
cognitive systems is relevant to military coalition operations because such approaches help us to 
understand  the  factors  that  contribute  to  both  the  efficiency  and  quality  of  problem-solving 
processes  in  collaborative,  network-enabled,  distributed  teams.  By  developing  a  better 
understanding  of  the  cognitive  impact  of  network  systems  on  both  individual  and  collective 
problem-solving, we are in a much better position to engage in interventions  that enhance the 
cognitive power and potential of military coalition formations.  
Of course, the possibility for network-mediated forms of cognitive extension is not something that is 
relevant just to military coalitions; the increasing ubiquity and pervasiveness of network systems 
motivates a more general interest in the effect of network technologies on our human cognitive 
potential. As Hollan et al (2000) comment: 
“As we build richer, more all-encompassing, computational environments it becomes 
more  important  than  ever  to  understand  the  ways  human  agents  and  their  local 
environments  are  tightly  coupled  in  the  processing  loops  that  result  in  intelligent 
action.” (pg. 186) 
The advent of new computing technologies and network-enabled capabilities highlights a potential 
milestone in our human cognitive evolution. Just as the ability to use and exploit linguistic encodings 
marked  a  seachange  in  our  individual  and  collective  cognitive  abilities,  so  the  development  of 
ubiquitous network systems, wearable computing devices and pervasive computing, presents us 
with unparalleled opportunities for cognitive extension at both the individual and collective levels. 
Ours, we suggest, are ‘fishnet’ minds, ones that are increasingly enmeshed in complex networks of 
technological, linguistic and social influence. As we learn to exploit those networks for our cognitive 
good or ill, so too we must cast our philosophical and scientific explanatory nets ever wider. In this The Network-Extended Mind 
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way we may, at last, come to see the human mind for what it really is: not as some immaterial spirit 
stuff  that  emerges  solely  from  the  machinations  of  the  human  brain,  but  as  a  set  of  physical 
processes that occasionally escape their cranial confines and extend out into the world.    
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